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The Sexual Harassment Loophole 
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter  
Abstract  
Employers rarely pay for sexual harassment. The #MeToo 
movement has not changed this legal reality. Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964—the nation’s primary workplace 
antidiscrimination law—contains a harassment loophole. 
Harassment is the only kind of Title VII violation that allows 
employers to avoid liability if they offer training and reporting 
opportunities to workers. In contrast, employers must 
automatically pay for all other Title VII claims such as 
discriminatory firings, even when firms have trained their 
employees not to discriminate. This Article makes the case for 
closing the loophole by aligning harassment liability with other 
Title VII offenses and holding employers automatically 
responsible for all proven incidents of workplace harassment. 
When the Supreme Court created the harassment loophole 
years ago, it assumed that employers would enact workplace 
measures to effectively deter harassment. Unfortunately, the 
#MeToo movement has convincingly demonstrated that the 
problem of workplace harassment remains widespread despite 
decades of harassment training. Even though firms express a 
rhetorical commitment to antiharassment values, many 
employers engage only in cosmetic compliance and fail to take 
meaningful steps to actually curb harassment. Closing the 
harassment loophole would not only represent a tangible legal 
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solution to the ongoing problem of harassment, it would also 
advance the goals of compensation, deterrence, and 
cost-spreading that lie at the core of Title VII. Just as companies 
must pay for all other Title VII violations—regardless of formal 
policies that prohibit misconduct—courts should hold firms 
strictly accountable for sexual harassment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Employers rarely pay for sexual harassment.1 The #MeToo 
movement has not changed this legal reality.2 Since #MeToo 
began several years ago, the movement has raised awareness 
about sexual misconduct and empowered victims to come 
forward.3 Survivors have told their stories about workplace 
abuse, and employers have fired many high-profile men.4 But 
despite #MeToo’s initial wave of consciousness-raising, the 
movement has said very little about the actual law that governs 
workplace harassment: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 
In light of this vacuum, a vital question still looms over the 
movement: Will #MeToo continue to operate primarily as a 
social movement, or will it transform into a legal movement that 
effectively combats sexual harassment?6 
 
 1. See infra Part III.A. 
 2. See infra Part I.B. 
 3. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 
YALE L.J.F. 22, 25 (2018) (discussing how the #MeToo movement has 
facilitated solidarity among victims). 
 4. See Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex: #MeToo, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825, 832–33 
(2019) (explaining how #MeToo advocates criticize the state for failing to 
adequately combat harassment). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17; see Lesley Wexler et al., #MeToo, 
Time’s Up, and Theories of Justice, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 53 (discussing the 
need for deeper cultural and structural changes in the wake of #MeToo); Rafia 
Zakaria, The Legal System Needs to Catch Up with the #MeToo Movement, 
NATION (Apr. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/U76J-XAR7 (calling for a broader 
discussion of legal reforms within the #MeToo movement). 
 6. See L. Camille Hébert, Is “MeToo” Only a Social Movement or a Legal 
Movement Too?, 22 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 321, 324 (2018) (examining 
unanswered questions about #MeToo’s impact); see also Tristin K. Green, Was 
Sexual Harassment Law a Mistake? The Stories We Tell, 128 YALE L.J.F. 152, 
167 (2018) (discussing the need for legal reforms to combat workplace 
harassment); Deborah L. Rhode, #MeToo: Why Not? What Next, 69 DUKE L.J. 
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Despite the harrowing stories of many #MeToo victims, the 
unfortunate truth is that most of their claims would fail in court 
because federal law largely immunizes employers from sexual 
harassment liability.7 Even when plaintiffs can prove that they 
were sexually assaulted or harassed at work, companies can 
avoid paying for this misconduct if they implemented 
antiharassment training and corrective procedures.8 This 
defense—that firms can escape liability by instituting internal 
reporting schemes—is unique to harassment law and does not 
apply to other Title VII violations such as discriminatory 
discharges.9   
In contrast to the law’s take on sexual harassment—where 
victims must first utilize their employers’ reporting systems to 
obtain relief—Title VII holds firms automatically responsible 
for all other claims, regardless of an employer’s internal 
 
377, 379–80 (2019) (examining the #MeToo movement’s ability to catalyze 
“lasting change”).  
 7. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Ending Harassment by Starting with 
Retaliation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 49–50 (2018) (examining various 
reasons why most #MeToo harassment claims would fail in court); Julia 
Jacobs, #MeToo Cases’ New Legal Battleground: Defamation Lawsuits, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2020), https://perma.cc/UCL3-WS2M (describing common law 
claims that plaintiffs bring in lieu of harassment and other time-barred 
claims); Jodi Kantor, #MeToo Called for an Overhaul. Are Workplaces Really 
Changing?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/YVE3-PXHN 
(discussing the “giant holes in the federal laws meant to protect women from 
harassment”).  
 8. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998) 
(stating that the failure by an employee to comply with a company’s 
antiharassment procedures “will normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s 
burden”); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (noting 
that basing employer liability on a company’s efforts to create antiharassment 
policies would advance Title VII’s goals); see also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Sex 
Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal Incentives for 
Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62, 66–67 
(2018) (examining vicarious liability rules for hostile work environment 
claims). 
 9. See Susan Grover, After Ellerth: The Tangible Employment Action in 
Sexual Harassment Analysis, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 809, 809–11 (2002) 
(noting that harassment constitutes the sole exception to the rule that holds 
employers vicariously liable for antidiscrimination violations). 
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procedures or fault.10 For example, if a supervisor violates Title 
VII by refusing to hire a non-white applicant,  a rule of strict 
vicarious liability11 would hold the employer responsible for the 
supervisor’s racist act, regardless of the employer’s fault.12 Even 
if the company had explicitly prohibited race-based 
decision-making and had no knowledge of the supervisor’s 
misconduct, the company would still have to pay.13 Likewise, if 
a bigoted manager fires an employee because of her religion or 
sex in violation of Title VII, courts would hold the company 
automatically responsible.14 For liability purposes, it would not 
matter whether the company offered anti-bias training or 
whether the victim reported the violation to her employer.15   
Title VII contains a sexual harassment loophole. By 
“loophole,” I mean that there is only one type of Title VII 
 
 10. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 273, 280–82 (1995) (contrasting Title VII’s 
rule of strict employer liability for discrimination with the rule of notice-based 
liability for harassment).  
11.  “Vicarious liability” imposes legal responsibility on one party for the 
wrongful acts of another. See Alan Q. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious 
Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related 
Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 563 (1988). In the workplace context, 
if courts hold employers vicariously liable for employees’ unlawful behavior, 
the liability is “strict” or “automatic” in the sense that employers cannot escape 
legal responsibility for the employees’ acts by proving that employers exercised 
reasonable care to prevent the unlawful behavior. Id. at 577 (discussing the 
relationship between “strict” and “vicarious” liability for sexual harassment 
claims); see infra Part III.A. 
 12. See Theresa M. Beiner, Using Evidence of Women’s Stories in Sexual 
Harassment Cases, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 117, 144 (2001) 
(questioning the value of giving employers an affirmative defense to 
harassment claims based on training and reporting procedures). 
 13. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 280–82 (describing the different 
metrics used to evaluate employer liability for discrimination and 
harassment). 
 14. See id. at 281–82 (outlining liability standards for workplace 
discrimination). 
 15. See Maria M. Carrillo, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a 
Supervisor Under Title VII: Reassessment of Employer Liability in Light of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 24 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 74–75 (1992) 
(criticizing the differential treatment of harassment liability versus other 
forms of Title VII liability). 
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violation—harassment16—that allows employers to avoid 
liability by offering training and reporting opportunities to their 
workers.17 This Article makes the case for closing the loophole 
by aligning harassment liability with other antidiscrimination 
offenses and holding employers automatically responsible for all 
proven incidents of sexual harassment.   
The Supreme Court created the harassment loophole in 
1998 by announcing two landmark decisions that functionally 
granted immunity to employers with antiharassment policies 
and reactive procedures.18 Since then, consultants and human 
resources departments have bombarded firms with advice on 
how to reduce their legal exposure to harassment claims, even 
though there is very little social science data to prove that these 
policies actually reduce harassment.19 Nevertheless, the Court 
assumed that reporting schemes would effectively curb 
harassment.20 Scholars have criticized the Court’s holdings on 
 
 16. This Article addresses harassment based on sex and gender only. 
Title VII also prohibits harassment based on other protected categories such 
as race, religion, and national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. The judicial 
development of these other forms of harassment took different trajectories 
during the 1970s. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent 
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 951–92 (1993) (discussing the early 
history of harassment claims under Title VII). More recently, courts have 
applied identical rules of vicarious liability to all forms of harassment. See L. 
Camille Hébert, Analogizing Race and Sex in Workplace Harassment Claims, 
58 OHIO ST. L.J. 819, 849 (1997) (outlining the legal parallels between sexual 
and racial harassment claims).   
 17. See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text. 
 18. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (announcing the standard for employer 
liability in sexual harassment cases); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764 (same). 
 19. See ANNA-MARIA MARSHALL, CONFRONTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE 
LAW AND POLITICS OF EVERYDAY LIFE 15 (2016) (examining the proliferation of 
antiharassment consulting firms).  
 20. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) 
(discussing Title VII’s objectives of “promo[ting] conciliation rather than 
litigation” and “encourag[ing] employees to report harassing conduct”); 
Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: 
Vicarious Liability Under Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 755, 787–88 (1999) (analyzing incentives related to 
antiharassment policies).  
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both empirical and doctrinal grounds.21 This Article advances 
these critiques in light of #MeToo and explains how the 
movement underscores the ineffectiveness of current 
antiharassment procedures. Over two decades after the Court 
bet that reporting systems would limit harassment, the sheer 
number of #MeToo stories shows that sexual misconduct 
continues to proliferate throughout American workplaces 
despite years of antiharassment education and internal 
reporting schemes.22 Today, the unfortunate reality is that too 
many companies engage in performative acts of “cosmetic 
compliance” that formally adhere to the Court’s mandate 
without meaningfully reducing harassment.23  
Courts defend the harassment loophole by pointing to Title 
VII’s language, which extends liability only to “employers” 
based on the acts of their “agents.”24 Interpreting this text, the 
 
 21. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Two Very Different Stories: Vicarious 
Liability Under Tort and Title VII Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1324–25 (2014) 
(asserting that vicarious liability for harassment applies to only a small set of 
cases); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 787–88 (questioning whether 
harassment victims would be more likely to raise complaints based on changes 
to vicarious liability rules); Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual 
Harassment Law, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 817, 860 (2005) [hereinafter Lawton, 
Bad Apple Theory] (critiquing Title VII’s liability framework for misapplying 
agency principles); Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The 
Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 
206–10 (2004) [hereinafter Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum] 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s vicarious liability rules have not reduced 
supervisory harassment). 
 22. See Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final 
Triumph of Form over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. 
WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 3 (2003) (asserting that many employers implement 
antiharassment trainings to avoid liability, rather than to reduce 
harassment).  
 23. See Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal Implications of the MeToo 
Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229, 243 (2018) (discussing how the #MeToo 
movement has shed light on the failures of internal reporting systems).  
 24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (“The term ‘employer’ means a person engaged 
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and 
any agent of such a person.”); see also Chamallas, supra note 21, at 1318–19 
(discussing the statutory justifications for the harassment loophole). Courts 
have largely declined to hold individuals personally liable for Title VII 
harassment claims. See Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment 
and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1583, 1606–07 (2018) (“[I]ndividuals 
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Supreme Court has held that only supervisors are “agents” for 
Title VII purposes and that supervisory misconduct attaches to 
firms only when supervisors take “tangible employment actions” 
such as hiring and firing.25 But these holdings reflect an 
outdated view of agency law. In fact, outside the harassment 
context, courts often hold employers vicariously liable (i.e., 
legally responsible regardless of company fault) for the 
misconduct of ordinary employees as agents (i.e., not just 
supervisors) for all sorts of misconduct (i.e., not just firings).26 
To use a classic example, if a delivery driver runs a red light and 
injures a pedestrian, the driver’s employer must pay for the 
damages, even if the employee was not a supervisor and even if 
the employee broke a workplace rule that explicitly prohibited 
bad driving.27 Beyond mere negligence, many jurisdictions 
require employers to pay even for some acts of intentional 
employee misconduct.28 Employers must compensate victims for 
these harms not because the employers engaged in wrongdoing 
but because the employee’s misconduct relates to work activities 
and foreseeable wrongs.29   
 
who commit sexual harassment generally will be immune from personal 
liability under Title VII.”). 
 25. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 431–32 (2013).  
 26. See Martha Chamallas, Vicarious Liability in Torts: The Sex 
Exception, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 133, 136 (2013) (noting that courts can hold 
employers vicariously liable for employee misconduct even when employees 
break work rules); Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability 
Under Agency Principles: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1229, 1244–45 (1991) (noting that workers who are 
labeled “employees,” “supervisors,” or “managers” can expose their employers 
to vicarious liability). 
 27. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: 
Title VII Liability of Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their 
Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 66, 138–39 (1995) (discussing various 
common law scenarios involving vicarious liability). 
 28. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 292–93 (examining situations in 
which courts hold defendants vicariously responsible for intentional 
misconduct). 
 29. See David B. Oppenheimer, Employer Liability for Sexual 
Harassment by Supervisors, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 272, 
274 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (discussing 
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Just as courts hold employers strictly liable for careless 
delivery drivers under agency law and racist hiring managers 
under Title VII, they should hold companies strictly liable for 
sexual harassment as well. Although some legal scholars have 
proposed expanding this type of vicarious responsibility when 
supervisors commit sexual harassment,30 this Article goes 
further and argues that today’s workplace realities, as revealed 
by #MeToo, justify requiring employers to pay for all forms of 
employee harassment, both coworker harassment and 
supervisory harassment alike.31 The #MeToo movement has 
shown that harassment by fellow employees remains an 
unacceptably common event.32 Given the breadth of the 
problem, employers should bear the costs of this frequent, 
predictable form of employee mistreatment.   
Requiring employers to pay for all instances of employee 
harassment—whether committed by supervisors or 
coworkers— would advance the goals of compensation, 
deterrence, and cost-spreading that lie at the core of Title VII 
 
rationales for holding employers strictly liable for intentional employee 
misconduct). 
 30. See, e.g., Carrillo, supra note 15, at 52 (emphasizing the need for 
courts to treat the harms caused by sexual harassment as seriously as other 
forms of discrimination); Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: 
Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 735–36 
(2000) (arguing for strict employer liability for supervisory harassment, but 
for limiting damages when plaintiffs fail to mitigate); Phillips, supra note 26, 
at 1268–69 (asserting that strict employer liability for supervisory harassment 
provides the greatest incentive for employers to implement effective 
antiharassment programs). 
 31. For pre-#MeToo scholarship that argued in favor of establishing 
vicarious liability for supervisory and coworker harassment, see, e.g., 
Chamallas, supra note 21, at 1343–44 (arguing for new legislation to expand 
employer liability to all discriminatory acts that employees commit); Fisk & 
Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 789 (describing the prevention of harassment 
as a non-delegable employer duty); Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 107–18 
(advocating for strict employer liability for coworker harassment based on 
agency principles). 
 32. See Anita Hill, Let’s Talk About How to End Sexual Violence, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/Q7DQ-TD65 (explaining how #MeToo 
highlighted the experience of millions of sexual abuse survivors).  
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and agency law.33 For instance, a rule of strict employer liability 
would increase the chances that #MeToo victims would receive 
payment for their injuries, thus advancing Title VII’s 
compensation objective.34 Automatic liability would also serve 
Title VII’s deterrence goal by creating additional incentives for 
employers to implement tailored preventative measures that 
actually curb sexual misconduct rather than engaging in 
cosmetic compliance.35 As to the issue of cost-spreading, it might 
seem unfair to force employers to assume the risks and losses 
associated with all forms of employee harassment, especially 
when firms take genuine steps to reduce harassment by 
implementing training and reporting  systems. But as courts 
have decided in other vicarious liability contexts, when 
companies reap the economic benefits of their activities, society 
expects them to pay for the foreseeable costs of employee 
misbehavior, even when that misconduct violates explicit 
workplace rules.36   
Critics could raise several objections to this proposal. For 
example, expanded employer liability might cause male 
managers to avoid interacting with female subordinates, limit 
 
 33. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 85–86 (discussing the relationship 
between vicarious liability and Title VII’s core objectives); Chamallas, supra 
note 26, at 150–51 (outlining the role vicarious liability plays in distributing 
losses); Grossman, supra note 30, at 721–22 (examining Title VII’s twin goals 
of compensation and deterrence). 
 34. See Michael C. Harper, Employer Liability for Harassment Under 
Title VII: A Functional Rationale for Faragher and Ellerth, 36 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 41, 58–59 (1999) (discussing Title VII’s twin objectives of compensating 
victims and preventing future acts of discrimination). 
 35. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) 
(emphasizing the importance of prevention in Title VII’s statutory scheme); 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (expressing hope 
that the harassment loophole would further Title VII’s “deterrent purpose”); 
see also Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum, supra note 21, at 200 
(noting that the Supreme Court emphasized Title VII’s deterrence objective 
when it created the harassment loophole). 
 36. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Employer Liability for Sexual 
Harassment—Normative, Descriptive, and Doctrinal Interactions: A Reply to 
Professors Beiner and Bisom-Rapp, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 169, 196 
(2001) (discussing situations where employers must pay for employee 
misconduct). 
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the due process rights of accused harassers, or force firms to pay 
for minor misconduct, all while failing to address Title VII’s 
other structural deficiencies.37 Despite the facial appeal of these 
concerns, however, closing the harassment loophole represents 
a vastly preferable alternative to the status quo.  
First, if strict vicarious liability caused some employees to 
avoid accusations of harassment by limiting their contact with 
female coworkers, this marginalization would constitute a 
separate Title VII violation.38 Although such claims of exclusion 
are notoriously difficult to prove, if closing the harassment 
loophole actually caused more supervisors to block women from 
networking and advancement opportunities, the chances of 
highlighting these violations would increase as unlawful 
occurrences became more prevalent.39 To the extent that Title 
VII might fail to correct informal or opaque exclusionary 
practices, such an outcome would simply highlight the existing 
limitations of antidiscrimination law—it would not provide a 
rationale for continuing to limit employers’ exposure to 
harassment claims.  
Second, as to the rights of accused harassers, heightened 
liability would actually increase the likelihood of a fair 
investigation.40 Today, firms often take advantage of the 
harassment loophole by summarily firing alleged perpetrators 
to publicly exhibit their commitment to antiharassment 
 
 37. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 69–70 (examining the possible 
unintended consequences of uncritically embracing proposals for expanded 
harassment training); Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1592 (outlining certain 
backlash concerns with expanding corporate liability for sexual misconduct). 
 38. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 817 (1991) 
(discussing the evolution of sex discrimination and harassment claims under 
Title VII); Joan C. Williams & Suzanne Lebsock, Now What?, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://perma.cc/JT9Q-XJU5 (noting that a manager’s refusal 
to hold closed-door meetings with women would violate Title VII if the same 
manager held such meetings with men). 
 39. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE 
L.J. 728, 805 (2011) (discussing the difficulty of combating subtle acts of 
discrimination); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 468 (2001) 
(explaining how antidiscrimination law frequently fails to combat patterns of 
interaction that exclude nondominant groups over time). 
 40. See infra Part I.A.1. 
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values.41 But if courts were to hold companies automatically 
liable for all employee harassment, regardless of subsequent 
disciplinary measures, then employers would actually have 
fewer incentives to arbitrarily discharge accused harassers until 
such allegations were proven.42 At the same time, victims and 
firms would still retain incentives to participate in 
investigations because, although courts would hold firms 
automatically responsible for damages regardless of notice, the 
amount of those damages would depend on site-specific facts, 
such as whether the company effectively reduced 
harassment-related harms after they were unearthed.43 Finally, 
even with strict liability in place, harassment law would still 
retain many doctrinal safeguards to limit frivolous claims.44   
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I critically evaluates 
the #MeToo movement’s legal impact by assessing several 
post-#MeToo judicial opinions that have dismissed plaintiffs’ 
allegations of sexual harassment. These very recent federal 
decisions show how employers continue to rely on the 
harassment loophole to avoid Title VII liability, even in the 
wake of #MeToo. Part II explains how the Supreme Court first 
created the harassment loophole by embracing the assumption 
that limited liability would prompt employers to adopt effective 
reporting schemes. But given that #MeToo has undermined this 
assumption, Part III explains why a scheme that holds 
employers strictly liable for employee harassment would better 
comport with the text, purpose, and structure of Title VII, as 
well as underlying agency rationales. The Article concludes by 
responding to several possible objections.  
 
 41. See Ramit Mizrahi, Sexual Harassment Law After #MeToo: Looking 
to California as a Model, 128 YALE L.J.F. 121, 133–34 (2018) (explaining how 
employers often take immediate corrective action against harassers who are 
viewed as “fungible”). 
 42. Cf. Porter, supra note 7, at 60 (noting that the harassment loophole 
can incentivize sudden employee terminations).  
 43. See Grossman, supra note 30, at 735–36 (arguing for a strict liability 
approach to supervisory harassment that would allow for reduced damages 
when firms respond effectively to complaints).  
 44. Chamallas, supra note 21, at 1344. 
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Even when employees repeatedly grope, ridicule, or demean 
coworkers because of their gender, employers nearly always 
avoid liability.45 The #MeToo movement has convincingly 
demonstrated that despite firms’ rhetorical commitment to 
antiharassment values, the problem of workplace harassment 
remains widespread.46 Closing the harassment loophole 
represents a tangible legal solution to this problem. Just as 
companies must pay for all other Title VII 
violations— regardless of formal policies that prohibit 
misconduct—courts should hold firms strictly accountable for 
sexual harassment.   
I.  THE #METOO MOVEMENT’S EFFECT ON HARASSMENT LAW 
The #MeToo movement has revealed two stubborn realities 
about sexual harassment in American workplaces. First, despite 
a decades-long federal prohibition against harassment, many 
women and a significant number of men47 still experience high 
levels of gender-based harassment at work.48 Second, the 
movement has given victims an opportunity to end years of 
silence and openly share harrowing stories of sexual 
 
 45. See Estrich, supra note 38, at 844 (noting that courts have limited 
Title VII’s reach “to only the most extreme cases of sexual harassment”); 
Grover, supra note 9, at 824–25 (summarizing studies that show how 
employers win when they utilize the harassment loophole). 
 46. See Hill, supra note 32 (discussing the prevalence of sexual 
harassment in the wake of #MeToo). 
 47. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 62–63 (questioning the effectiveness 
of antiharassment trainings standing alone); Vicki Schultz et al., Open 
Statement on Sexual Harassment from Employment Discrimination Law 
Scholars, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 25–26 (2018) (explaining that male 
harassment victims are typically harassed by other men). 
 48. See EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGES ALLEGING 
SEX-BASED HARASSMENT (CHARGES FILED WITH EEOC) FY 2010–FY 2019 
(2019), https://perma.cc/498R-5G2X (reporting that nearly 85 percent of 
harassment charges were filed by women in fiscal year 2018); see also MAYA 
RAGHU & JOANNA SURIANI, #METOOWHATNEXT: STRENGTHENING WORKPLACE 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT PROTECTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 1 (2017), https://
perma.cc/6W9Z-BM72 (PDF) (summarizing sexual harassment charge 
statistics). 
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mistreatment.49 This section considers how the two realities 
revealed by the movement—prevalent harassment and 
prevalent silence—relate to the current legal regulation of 
sexual harassment at work. In short, #MeToo has uncovered a 
fundamental mismatch between the requirements of Title VII 
and the reality of ongoing sexual harassment. Whereas Title VII 
rewards employers that provide antiharassment training to 
their workers, harassment remains widespread even with 
anti-bias schemes in place.50 Likewise, the #MeToo movement 
has explained why credible fears of retaliation cause many 
victims to stay silent.51 And yet the law of sexual harassment 
still requires victims to quickly speak out about their 
harassment experiences or risk losing in court.52 To illustrate 
how the #MeToo movement has failed to disrupt these 
dynamics, this section concludes by critically evaluating several 
post-#MeToo judicial decisions that have utilized the 
harassment loophole to dismiss Title VII complaints. 
A.  #MeToo, Backlash, and Calls for More Training 
Although sexual assault survivors used the phrase “me too” 
as early as 2006,53 the modern iteration of the #MeToo 
 
 49. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could 
Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/SX29-L83N (concluding that 
“[m]any survivors realistically judged reporting pointless”). 
 50. See Robin West, Manufacturing Consent, BAFFLER (May 15, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/62TA-SYKW (questioning why a legal norm does not yet exist 
to effectively curb harassment).  
 51. See Mizrahi, supra note 41, at 125 (reporting data on retaliation 
against harassment complainants). 
 52. See Grossman, supra note 30, at 700–03 (discussing how silence or 
delayed reporting can defeat plaintiffs’ sexual harassment claims). 
 53. See Mimi A. Akel, Note, The Good, the Bad, and the Evils of the 
#MeToo Movement’s Sexual Harassment Allegations in Today’s Society: A 
Cautionary Tale Regarding the Cost of These Claims to the Victims, the 
Accused, and Beyond, 49 CAL. W. INT’L. L.J. 103, 107 (2018) (noting that 
Tarana Burke used the term “me too” in 2006 to connect survivors of sexual 
abuse).  
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movement began in 2017.54 On October 5, 2017, numerous 
women publicly accused movie producer Harvey Weinstein of 
sexual violence or harassment.55 Ten days later, the actress 
Alyssa Milano sent the following tweet: “If you’ve ever been 
sexually harassed or assaulted write ‘me too’ as a reply to this 
tweet.”56 Within weeks, millions of people across the country 
utilized the hashtag “#MeToo” to share their own stories of 
sexual abuse.57 Although not all of these claims involved 
workplace harassment, the range of contexts, locales, and types 
of abuse alleged in these stories demonstrated the myriad ways 
in which sexual misconduct reinforced gender-based power 
dynamics in both work- and non-work settings.58   
Throughout the months and years that followed, scores of 
individuals publicly brought allegations of misconduct against 
prominent men in entertainment, the media, the arts, the 
restaurant business, and law, among other industries.59 Many 
well-known men in these sectors either quit or were fired, 
including Weinstein, Matt Lauer, Charlie Rose, Leslie Moonves, 
 
 54. See State Regulation of Sexual Harassment, 20 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 
421, 422 (2019) (describing the unprecedented attention that harassment 
allegations received during the early days of the #MeToo movement). 
 55. See Ann C. McGinley, The Masculinity Motivation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 99, 99–100 (2018) (summarizing the early history of the #MeToo 
movement); Tippett, supra note 23, at 230 (same). 
 56. See Martha Chamallas, Will Tort Law Have Its #Me Too Moment?, 11 
J. TORT L. 39, 67 (2018) (discussing the initial history of the #MeToo 
movement); Hébert, supra note 6, at 321–22 (examining the evolution of the 
#MeToo movement). 
 57. See State Regulation of Sexual Harassment, supra note 54, at 422–23 
(noting that the allegations of sexual misconduct against Weinstein ranged in 
severity from off-color comments to rape); The Harvey Weinstein Story: From 
Studio to Courtroom in 40 Years, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc
/E5J4-7ZQP (summarizing the timeline of key events from the #MeToo 
movement). 
 58. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 24–25 (discussing the importance of 
addressing institutional forms of harassment); Brian Soucek, Queering Sexual 
Harassment Law, 128 YALE L.J.F. 67, 69–70 (2018) (explaining how #MeToo 
stories revealed underlying gender-based power structures). 
 59. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 73–74 (describing the cascade of 
accusations that the Weinstein case triggered); Tippett, supra note 23, at 
231– 32 (outlining the breadth and depth of #MeToo accusations). 
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Mario Batali, Garrison Keillor, and Ninth Circuit Judge Alex 
Kozinski.60 At the same time that these high-profile falls from 
grace occurred in rapid succession, the larger issue of sexual 
harassment shot to the forefront of national news and popular 
attention.61 Focusing on the connection between famous #MeToo 
stories and larger employment structures, advocates explained 
how the problem of sexual harassment persisted even in 
ordinary workplaces.62 In the course of exposing these various 
iterations of sexual misconduct—both in popular media stories 
and in less-publicized settings—the #MeToo movement 
highlighted the dispiriting reality that harassment remains far 
too common, despite decades of advocacy and legal reforms to 
combat the problem.63 
1.  Questioning #MeToo’s Fairness and Lasting Impact  
As with many social movements, #MeToo has triggered a 
backlash, with critics charging that the movement undermines 
due process protections for the accused.64 Characterizing 
#MeToo as a “naming and shaming” campaign, skeptics argue 
that the movement leaves little time for fair investigations.65 
According to this critique, statements like “#BelieveWomen” 
 
 60. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Of Power and Process: Handling 
Harassers in an At-Will World, 128 YALE L.J.F. 85, 85–86 (2018); Chamallas, 
supra note 56, at 67–68 (analyzing third-party responsibility for sexual 
violence); Kenneth R. Davis, Strong Medicine: Fighting the Sexual 
Harassment Pandemic, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 1057, 1058 (2018) (explaining how the 
#MeToo movement highlighted widespread instances of harassment).  
 61. See Tippett, supra note 23, at 230–34 (outlining the connection 
between publicized #MeToo stories and the limitations of antidiscrimination 
law). 
 62. See Murray, supra note 4, at 833–34 (examining #MeToo’s broader 
critique of the state’s failure to impose appropriate consequences on sexual 
harassers). 
 63. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 24–25 (highlighting the need for a 
theoretical framework to address harassment). 
 64. See Emily Yoffee, Why the #MeToo Movement Should Be Ready for a 
Backlash, POLITICO (Dec. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/F9KH-DQMC (outlining 
possible unintended consequences of #MeToo). 
 65. See Wexler et al., supra note 5, at 51 (summarizing critiques of the 
movement). 
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only exacerbate the problem by encouraging a rush to 
judgment.66   
Another line of critique asserts that #MeToo proponents fail 
to gauge the relative wrongdoing of various forms of 
misconduct.67 For example, within weeks of the Weinstein 
allegations, the names of many alleged perpetrators appeared 
on a so-called “Shitty Media Men” list.68 The author of the list 
invited others to lodge anonymous accusations, which ranged in 
severity from “weird lunch dates” and “creepy [direct message]s” 
to sexual assault and brutal rape.69 Yet, despite the huge 
variation in these allegations, the proposed punishments for 
such transgressions usually involved some form of career 
destruction or social ostracism.70 Such calls for banishment, 
regardless of relative wrongdoing, have prompted cynics to 
analogize #MeToo to a “witch hunt” or “sex panic.”71  
Even #MeToo backers have questioned the movement’s 
long-term ability to bring lasting change to American 
workplaces.72 The movement has undoubtedly raised social 
awareness about harassment and caused some state 
 
 66. See Yoffee, supra note 64 (arguing that the strength of the accusations 
against Harvey Weinstein derived partly from corroboration). 
 67. See Murray, supra note 4, at 867–70 (summarizing the due process 
concerns created by crowdsourced registries of alleged harassers). 
 68. See Masha Gessen, When Does a Watershed Become a Sex Panic, NEW 
YORKER (Nov. 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/KGW9-V7LM (critiquing the #MeToo 
movement for failing to afford due process to the accused and for failing to 
differentiate among various acts of alleged misconduct). 
 69. See Andrew Sullivan, It’s Time to Resist the Excesses of #MeToo, N.Y. 
MAG. (Jan. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/9FYQ-668G (calling for greater 
distinctions between different types of sexual misconduct). 
 70. See id. (critiquing #MeToo advocates for the limited range of penalties 
that they propose).  
 71. See Nora Stewart, Note, The Light We Shine into the Grey: A 
Restorative #MeToo Solution and an Acknowledgment of Those #MeToo Leaves 
in the Dark, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1693, 1703–04 (2019) (discussing charges 
that #MeToo has failed to differentiate between various forms of sexual 
misconduct). 
 72. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 3, at 25 (arguing for tangible actions in 
the wake of #MeToo); Wexler et al., supra note 5, at 53 (discussing the need to 
enact deeper cultural and structural changes following #MeToo). 
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legislatures to revisit their antiharassment laws.73 But the most 
visible, tangible responses to #MeToo have focused on the 
discharges of high-profile men.74 These firings, while often 
justified, do not necessarily change the environments that 
allowed harassment to flourish.75 Likewise, discharging 
harassers one-by-one does not repair the reputational damage 
that victims suffered or necessarily disrupt the underlying 
institutional conditions that fostered harassment in the first 
place.76 In fact, publicly discharging notable men may give the 
appearance of effective corporate responses, while actually 
reducing public pressure to bring about more robust, structural 
reforms.77 Beyond high-profile media firings, another practical 
impact of the #MeToo movement has involved the far more 
mundane exercise of expanding reporting systems at ordinary 
workplaces.78 
2.  Expansion of Training and Reporting Schemes in the 
Wake of #MeToo 
Even though the #MeToo movement has highlighted the 
prevalence of sexual harassment, employers have not 
fundamentally altered their methods for dealing with this 
ongoing problem.79 While some employers have reaffirmed the 
 
 73. See RAGHU & SURIANI, supra note 48, at 2–7 (summarizing several 
state-based actions and recommendations for combating harassment); JoAnna 
Suriani, Note, “Reasonable Care to Prevent and Correct”: Examining the Role 
of Training in Workplace Harassment Law, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
801, 814–15 (2018) (examining mandatory training laws that states have 
enacted since 2018). 
 74. See Murray, supra note 4, at 833–34 (outlining common corporate 
responses to revelations of harassment).  
 75. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 26 (arguing for structural changes that 
go beyond merely discharging accused harassers).  
 76. See id. (discussing the need to take action beyond mass firings in 
response to #MeToo). 
 77. See Wexler et al., supra note 5, at 54 (examining how public firings 
can crowd out other antiharassment efforts).  
 78. See Suriani, supra note 73, at 803 (discussing corporate responses to 
#MeToo). 
 79. See Erin M. Morrissey, Comment, #MeToo Spells Trouble for Them 
Too: Sexual Harassment Scandals and the Corporate Board, 93 TUL. L. REV. 
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strength of their existing train-and-report mechanisms, others 
have expanded these systems following #MeToo.80 For example, 
when asked if they had taken any new steps in reaction to the 
movement, employers such as Wal-Mart, Target, Sears 
Holdings, Subway, Costco, and Aramark simply expressed 
commitment to their existing internal systems.81 Other firms 
have expanded their employee instructional materials or 
reevaluated their reporting methods.82 Reflecting these 
developments, the demand for antiharassment trainings has 
skyrocketed since the #MeToo movement began.83   
Employers have doubled-down on train-and-report systems 
at a time when their legal exposure to harassment claims has 
increased.84 The United States Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”)—the federal agency charged with 
enforcing Title VII—reported a 50 percent jump in sexual 
harassment lawsuits between 2017 and 2018, and most human 
resource professionals expect that the #MeToo movement will 
trigger a flood of litigation.85 
 
177, 199–200 (2018) (questioning whether #MeToo has brought about 
meaningful reforms to American workplaces). 
 80. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 63 (examining the effectiveness of 
antiharassment trainings); Rebecca Greenfield, Powerful Men Have Changed 
Their Behavior at Work Since #MeToo, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2018, 10:54 AM), 
https://perma.cc/HSH8-AZN9 (discussing the recent rise of harassment 
trainings and complaints). 
 81. See Kantor, supra note 7 (surveying employer responses to #MeToo). 
 82. See id. (contrasting #MeToo advocates’ call for greater accountability 
with the ineffectiveness of existing legal protections).  
 83. See Suriani, supra note 73, at 803–04 (noting the increased emphasis 
on train-and-report systems following #MeToo). 
 84. See id. (“The perceived threat of increasing litigation and the 
exposing of entrenched toxic workplace culture have caused demand for 
anti-harassment trainings to skyrocket as employers seek out training 
opportunities for their employees.”).  
 85. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, WHAT YOU SHOULD 
KNOW: EEOC LEADS THE WAY IN PREVENTING WORKPLACE HARASSMENT (2018), 
https://perma.cc/F6HT-T5W9 [hereinafter EEOC, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW]; 
Pamela M. Harper, The Anniversary of #MeToo: A Time of Reckoning for Law 
Firms, BUS. L. TODAY (Oct. 19, 2018), https://perma.cc/C8S6-GZQE 
(summarizing emerging reporting data following #MeToo); Morrissey, supra 
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Despite the increased number of harassment charges, 
however, when these future plaintiffs try to sue in court, they 
will encounter a legal system that regularly dismisses 
harassment claims.86 As explained in greater detail below, the 
harassment loophole immunizes employers from liability by 
taking advantage of in-house reporting schemes in two distinct 
ways.87 First, harassment victims who neglect to file internal 
complaints typically cannot sue because courts require them to 
“take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities” 
that their employers offer.88 For the vast majority of harassment 
victims, the chance to obtain relief ends at this point because 
very few individuals who experience harassment ever utilize 
their employers’ reporting systems.89 In addition, plaintiffs who 
officially inform their employers of harassing behaviors also lose 
in court if their employers “correct promptly any sexually 
harassing behavior” after a complaint is filed.90 As such, the 
harassment loophole allows victims to obtain relief only if 
individuals file in-house complaints and their employers fail to 
adequately address the problem.91 
 
note 79, at 201–02 (discussing various predictions about #MeToo’s effect on 
victim reporting). 
 86. See Chamallas, supra note 56, at 57–58 (discussing the connection 
between the harassment loophole and the high loss rate that harassment 
plaintiffs experience in court).  
 87. See infra Part II.A.  
 88. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington 
Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998) (applying the harassment 
loophole to instances of supervisory harassment); see Vance v. Ball State 
Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 429–30 (2013) (applying the harassment loophole to 
instances of coworker harassment). 
 89. See RAGHU & SURIANI, supra note 48, at 1 (estimating that 70 percent 
of victims fail to report harassment); Porter, supra note 7, at 51–52 
(summarizing data on the reporting rates of harassment victims).  
 90. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 91. See Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 285 (discussing the fear that 
courts will not compensate victims who fail to inform their employers about 
harassment); E. Jacob Lindstrom, Note, All Carrots and No Sticks: Moving 
Beyond the Misapplication of Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 21 
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 111, 124–25 (2010) (explaining how many courts have 
allowed firms to utilize their reporting systems to completely avoid 
harassment liability). 
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In light of the safe harbor that this liability rule provides to 
firms, it is no coincidence that companies have reacted to 
#MeToo by pointing to their robust internal systems.92 This 
combination of silence, liability reduction, and harassment can 
be seen in several legal opinions that courts have issued in the 
wake of #MeToo.93 These cases demonstrate that the movement 
has done very little to change the existing legal dynamic that 
punishes silent victims and rewards employers that adopt 
train-and-report systems.94   
B.  Judicial Treatment of Harassment Claims Following 
#MeToo 
Even after #MeToo, courts still frequently absolve 
employers of legal responsibility for workplace harassment. 
Take the case of Tristana Hunt.95 A sales associate in the 
electronics department of a Wal-Mart store in Crestwood, 
Illinois, Hunt worked the overnight shift with her supervisor, 
Daniel Watson.96 Prior to working with the plaintiff, Watson 
had been accused of grabbing a female subordinate’s arm in a 
closed office and refusing to let go until the woman screamed.97 
The supervisor received “coaching” from Wal-Mart for the 
incident.98   
According to the plaintiff, shortly after Watson began 
supervising her, Watson told Hunt that “he did not understand 
 
 92. See Chamallas, supra note 21, at 1322 (examining how training and 
reporting systems tend to insulate most employers from liability); Zev J. Eigen 
et al., When Rules Are Made to Be Broken, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 109, 118–19 
(2014) (discussing the incentives employers have to implement policies that 
are “good enough to meet the minimum standard of reasonableness but not so 
good that they encourage prompt reporting of harassment in all cases”). 
 93. See infra Part I.B.   
 94. See Suriani, supra note 73, at 803–04 (addressing the increased 
demand for antiharassment trainings following #MeToo).  
 95. Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F.3d 624, 626 (7th Cir. 2019). 
 96. Id.; Brief and Required Short Appendix of Plaintiff-Appellant, 
Tristana Hunt at 5, Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 931 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(No. 18-3403), 2019 WL 1224347. 
 97. Hunt, 931 F.3d at 626.  
 98. Id. 
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how a woman could have breasts so large despite having a small 
body.”99 One month later, Watson said to Hunt that “he wanted 
to shower with her and feel her breasts.”100 Following that 
incident, Hunt took Watson’s phone from her hand and said that 
he wanted to find naked pictures of her and “again asked when 
he could see her breasts.”101 Recounting these incidents, the 
Seventh Circuit commented, “Watson asked to see Hunt’s 
breasts several times within a few days.”102 After enduring these 
harassing comments, Hunt formally complained to Wal-Mart.103 
Given that only Hunt and Watson witnessed the alleged 
harassment, however, Wal-Mart could not substantiate Hunt’s 
claims.104 Nevertheless, Wal-Mart reminded Watson of its 
“zero-tolerance policy” against harassment and required 
Watson to attend antiharassment training.105 Hunt reported no 
further incidents of harassment after she filed her internal 
complaint with Wal-Mart.106  
Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Hunt and 
writing in the post-#MeToo era, the Seventh Circuit 
characterized Watson’s multiple requests to see Hunt’s breasts 
as “offensive,” “sexually suggestive,” “unprofessional,” 
“unacceptable,” and “inappropriate.”107 Despite acknowledging 
the “inappropriate” nature of a male supervisor’s multiple 
requests to see his subordinate’s breasts, the Seventh Circuit 
nevertheless utilized the harassment loophole to absolve 
Wal-Mart of responsibility.108 In doing so, the court noted that 
“Wal-Mart had a comprehensive policy that explicitly prohibited 
 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 627. 
 103. Id. (“Immediately following this formal discipline, Hunt decided to 
report Watson’s harassment to the store manager . . . at the end of her shift.”).  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 626–28. 
 108. Id. at 627–28 (“An employer may escape liability if it can show the 
hostile work environment was not accompanied by an adverse employment 
action and prove an affirmative defense.”).  
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sexual harassment” and provided employees with “robust” 
reporting opportunities.109 Pointing to Hunt’s delayed reporting, 
the Seventh Circuit summarized the timeline as follows: 
Watson’s harassment occurred over the course of five months, 
and Hunt filed an internal complaint roughly two weeks after 
the supervisor made his last request to see her breasts.110 
According to the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the 
harassment loophole, Hunt waited too long to complain.111 Even 
though Hunt explained that she did not immediately go to 
Wal-Mart’s human resources department because she feared 
retaliation, the court held that “an employee’s subjective fears 
of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation do not alleviate 
the employee’s duty to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile 
environment.”112 Utilizing the harassment loophole to dismiss 
Hunt’s harassment complaint, the court held that Hunt had 
“unreasonably delayed” notifying Wal-Mart of the problem.113   
Turning from supervisory harassment to coworker 
harassment, the Eleventh Circuit recently issued a 
post-#MeToo decision that also utilized the harassment 
loophole.114 Nicole Patsalides worked as a law enforcement 
officer in Fort Pierce, Florida.115 According to Patsalides, a male 
patrol officer inappropriately touched various parts of her body 
at least ten times over the course of two weeks.116 On one 
occasion, the coworker rubbed his hand down Patsalides’s thigh, 
from her service belt to her knee.117 Unlike other harassment 
 
 109. Id. at 630. 
 110. Id. at 626–27. 
 111. Id. at 631 (“Hunt failed to take advantage of any reporting 
mechanisms for four months and thereby prevented Wal-Mart from taking 
corrective measures.”).  
 112. Id. (citation omitted) (crediting Wal-Mart for retraining Watson, even 
though the company’s internal investigation did not substantiate the 
harassment allegations against him).  
 113. See id. 
 114. See Patsalides v. City of Fort Pierce, 724 F. App’x 749, 752 (11th Cir. 
2018).  
 115. Id. at 750.  
 116. Id. at 751. 
 117. Id.  
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victims, however, Patsalides did not remain silent.118 Instead, 
she promptly complained to the police department, and her 
employer fired the male officer following an investigation.119 
After the discharge, Patsalides’s coworkers allegedly ridiculed 
her for “snitching” on a fellow police officer.120  
Praising the swiftness of the employer’s response, the 
Eleventh Circuit stated that “the [c]ity’s actions following the 
complaint were a model of proper employer responsiveness 
under Title VII.”121 It would be hard to disagree with this 
conclusion, except for the fact that the city had already verified 
numerous other incidents of sexual misconduct involving the 
same male patrol officer long before he touched Patsalides.122 In 
fact, the city had concluded that the officer had committed 
sexual misconduct on four separate occasions against various 
victims over the course of sixteen years.123 In response to these 
other incidents, the city had counseled the officer on proper 
behavior, issued written warnings, and suspended the officer 
without pay.124 Thus, Patsalides’s complaint of thigh-rubbing 
represented at least the fifth accusation against the same male 
patrol officer. Commenting on the male officer’s repeated 
transgressions, the Eleventh Circuit found that his employer 
had engaged in appropriate progressive discipline over sixteen 
years and that there was “no basis to hold the [c]ity liable for 
the male officer’s actions toward Patsalides.”125 
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit also issued a 
post-#MeToo decision that relied on the harassment loophole to 
 
 118. See id. (“After two weeks of this sort of behavior, Patsalides reported 
the male officer to a superior in the police department.”).  
 119. See id. (crediting the employer for responding effectively to 
harassment allegations). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 752. 
 124. See id. (concluding that the employer’s reaction to the harassment 
charges was “entirely consistent with the [c]ity’s obligations under Title VII”). 
 125. Id. 
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absolve an employer of liability for coworker harassment.126 
Carla Clehm, an ammunition plant employee in western 
Virginia, was sexually assaulted twice by her coworker, Joshua 
Linkous.127 A subsequent investigation revealed that Linkous 
had sexually assaulted at least three other female coworkers 
over the course of several years.128 According to the plaintiff, 
after Linkous was discharged and imprisoned, several 
coworkers sided with Linkous and began to harass Clehm for 
revealing the assault.129  
Writing its opinion roughly two years after the #MeToo 
movement began, and construing the facts in the plaintiff’s 
favor, the Fourth Circuit described how viciously Clehm’s 
coworkers treated her after she exposed Linkous’s sexual 
assaults. The court stated that “Clehm has experienced various 
incidents of harassment by co-workers who have grabbed her, 
subjected her to sexual and profane comments, berated her for 
‘putting a man in prison and taking him away from his 
family,’ . . . and objected to working alongside her.”130 But 
despite these repeated attacks on Clehm for coming forward, the 
Fourth Circuit still utilized the harassment loophole to dismiss 
her sexual harassment complaint. According to the court, 
“Clehm has not made the showing—required because she was 
sexually assaulted and harassed by her co-workers, rather than 
supervisors—that [the employer] ‘knew or should have known 
about the harassment and failed to take effective action to stop 
it.’”131 In light of Clehm’s initial silence about the sexual assault 
and her employer’s response thereafter, the Fourth Circuit 
 
 126. See Clehm v. BAE Sys. Ordnance Sys., Inc., 786 F. App’x 391, 394 
(4th Cir. 2019) (“Clehm has not demonstrated that her co-workers’ retaliatory 
harassment is imputable to BAE, nor has Clehm established that BAE 
subjected her to any other adverse employment action.”).  
 127. Id. at 392.  
 128. Id.  
 129. See id. at 392–93.  
 130. Id. at 393.  
 131. Id. at 393–94 (quoting Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325, 
333–34 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
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determined that Clehm’s employer was not responsible for the 
harassment.132  
In each of the foregoing cases, federal appellate courts 
issued opinions in the wake of #MeToo that utilized the 
harassment loophole to dismiss plaintiffs’ Title VII complaints. 
Even though the plaintiffs in these cases almost certainly 
alleged sufficient facts to constitute severe and pervasive 
harassment—breast gawking, thigh rubbing, victim 
blaming— it was not enough for courts to accept the truth of 
these allegations.133 In other words, the call by #MeToo 
advocates to “#BelieveWomen” did not matter in court because 
the harassment loophole enabled employers to escape liability, 
even if courts assumed the truth of the plaintiffs’ allegations.134 
The employers in these cases did not necessarily do 
anything wrong. Indeed, the courts in each decision specifically 
found that the firms responded appropriately once victims 
complained. But faced with the choice between forcing 
defendants to pay for harassment beyond their control or with 
leaving harassment victims uncompensated, each court utilized 
the harassment loophole to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Title VII 
claims. This outcome remains the rule, not the exception, even 
in the wake of #MeToo.135 Indeed, beyond the three federal 
appellate decisions discussed here, numerous other federal 
courts have relied on the harassment loophole to dismiss sexual 
harassment complaints during the months and years following 
#MeToo.136 Thus, despite the demand from #MeToo advocates 
 
 132. Id.  
 133. See Kate Webber Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require A Stronger Cure: The 
Lessons of Fox News for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PA. ST. L. 
REV. 463, 492–93 (2018) (discussing the standards for proving harassment 
under Title VII). 
 134. See Yoffee, supra note 64 (criticizing the call by some #MeToo 
proponents to “just believe” accusers).  
 135. See State Regulation of Sexual Harassment, supra note 54, at 465 
(discussing the judicial reluctance to alter the legal framework for analyzing 
harassment claims). 
 136. See, e.g., Cooper v. Smithfield Packing Co., Inc., 724 F. App’x 197, 203 
(4th Cir. 2018) (dismissing harassment complaint based on the harassment 
loophole); Tucker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 734 F. App’x 937, 942–43 (5th 
Cir. 2017) (same); Ferencin v. Lehigh Univ., No. 18-1469, 2019 WL 7282503, 
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for legal systems that compensate victims and hold employers 
accountable for workplace wrongs, the harassment loophole 
remains firmly in place. To understand why, the following 
section examines the origins of the harassment loophole and the 
empirical assumptions that the Supreme Court relied upon to 
create this safe harbor from employer liability.   
II.  DEVELOPING THE HARASSMENT LOOPHOLE 
The Supreme Court created the legal rules that govern 
sexual harassment long before the #MeToo movement. In 1986, 
the Court first declared that federal antidiscrimination law 
prohibited sexual harassment.137 A product of focused advocacy 
by legal feminists, the decision, Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson,138 was a historic victory for working women who had 
endured decades of gender-based mistreatment.139 Yet despite 
this extraordinary legal development, the Supreme Court 
blunted much of its effect over a decade later when, in 1998, the 
Court extended immunity to employers that adopted 
 
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2019) (same); Elkins v. Miller County., No. 18-cv-4115, 
2019 WL 5399516, at *6 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 22, 2019) (same); Opper v. Fred Beans 
Motors of Doylestown, Inc., No. 18-CV-4230, 2019 WL 4242627, at *8 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 6, 2019) (same); Holland v. NTP Marble, Inc., No. 17-cv-2909, 2019 WL 
2059966, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 2019) (same); Strozyk v. Phoenixville Hosp., 
357 F. Supp. 3d 485, 493 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (same); Payne v. Great Plains 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1194, 1204 (N.D. Okla. 2018) (same); 
Berger v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 16-cv-06557, 2018 WL 2943963, at *10 (E.D. 
Pa. June 13, 2018) (same). But see, e.g., Minarsky v. Susquehanna County, 895 
F.3d 303, 313 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding sufficient facts to question the 
effectiveness of an employer’s antiharassment policy); Wilson v. New Jersey, 
No. 16-7915, 2019 WL 5485395, at *13 (D.N.J. Oct. 25, 2019) (same); Mercado 
v. Sugarhouse HSP Gaming, L.P., No. 18-3641, 2019 WL 3318355, at *8 (E.D. 
Pa. July 23, 2019) (same); Rorke v. Toyota, 399 F. Supp. 3d 258, 280 (M.D. Pa. 
2019) (same); Grooms v. City of Phila., No. 17-2696, 2018 WL 4698856, at *8 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2018) (same). 
 137. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (holding that “a 
claim of ‘hostile environment’ sex discrimination is actionable under Title VII” 
(citation omitted)). 
 138.  Id. 
 139. See Green, supra note 6, at 152–53 (summarizing the general view 
that Meritor represented a “victory for workplace equality”). 
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train-and-report systems.140 Declining to hold companies 
strictly liable for sexual harassment, the Court opted instead for 
a notice-based system of liability that protected employers from 
most harassment claims.141 
This Part evaluates the history of the harassment loophole 
considering #MeToo. It explains how the Court embraced 
notice-based liability based on two flawed empirical 
assumptions that the #MeToo movement has now refuted.142 
First, the Court assumed that limiting employer liability would 
induce a large share of victims to bring their harassment 
allegations to employers.143 Second, the Court assumed that the 
loophole would significantly reduce incidents of harassment by 
inducing firms to adopt effective train-and-report schemes.144 
Unfortunately, decades after the Court first made this empirical 
wager, ongoing high levels of harassment undermine the basis 
for the Court’s faith in these systems.   
A.  Embracing Notice-Based Harassment Liability 
The Supreme Court began to form the harassment loophole 
when it first recognized sexual harassment as a legal claim. In 
 
 140. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806–07 (1998) 
(stating that an employer may raise an affirmative defense to a sexual 
harassment claim by “provid[ing] a proven, effective mechanism for reporting 
and resolving complaints of sexual harassment, available to the employee 
without undue risk or expense”); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
742, 765 (1998) (stating that an employer may raise an affirmative defense by 
showing that “the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct 
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and . . . that the plaintiff employee 
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective 
opportunities provided by the employer”). 
 141. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08 (explaining that an employer may 
satisfy its burden under the second element of its defense by “showing an 
unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the 
employer”); Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765–66 (same). 
 142. See infra notes 191–224 and accompanying text. 
 143. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806–07 (discussing administrative 
incentives to “encourage victims of harassment to come forward” (citation 
omitted)). 
 144. See id. at 807 (anticipating that the harassment loophole would 
“encourag[e] forethought by employers”). 
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a stunning and now widely celebrated ruling, the Court held in 
Meritor that sexual harassment constituted a form of prohibited 
sex discrimination under Title VII.145 The decision relied heavily 
on Catharine MacKinnon’s foundational book, Sexual 
Harassment of Working Women.146 In it, MacKinnon explained 
how unwanted sexual attention constituted an additional 
condition of work that women had to endure.147 For example, the 
first national survey on harassment at the time reported that 
92 percent of women described sexual harassment as a problem 
and one-third of women believed that their appearance was 
among their most important job qualifications.148 According to 
MacKinnon, federal antidiscrimination law prohibited 
employers from requiring women to work under these 
circumstances.149 By barring employers from imposing 
sex-based “conditions” of employment, Title VII also prohibited 
“sexual harassment,” even though the statute did not explicitly 
use the term “harassment.”150 
 
 145. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (concluding that a sex-based “hostile or 
abusive work environment” constitutes a violation of Title VII); see West, 
supra note 50 (discussing the historic nature of the Meritor ruling). 
 146. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF 
WORKING WOMEN (1979). See also Linda Hirshman, How the Supreme Court 
Made Sexual Harassment Cases More Difficult to Win, WASH. POST (June 19, 
2019, 6:00 AM), https://perma.cc/ZKV9-DYCB (referencing MacKinnon’s role 
in the Meritor case). 
 147. MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 40–41 (“Unwanted sexual 
advances . . . can be a daily part of a woman’s work life” and contribute to “the 
woman’s insecurity about her work competence.”). 
 148. See Kaitlin Menza, You Have to See Redbook’s Shocking 1976 Sexual 
Harassment Survey, REDBOOK MAG. (Nov. 28, 2016), https://perma.cc
/ZYG3-5BML (summarizing early survey data on sexual harassment); Ginia 
Bellafante, Before #MeToo, There Was Catharine A. MacKinnon and Her Book 
‘Sexual Harassment of Working Women’, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://
perma.cc/P3DM-XFXB (discussing the early history of harassment litigation). 
 149. See MACKINNON, supra note 146, at 208 (stating that when sexual 
harassment “has an impact upon fundamental employment decisions and 
upon the workplace atmosphere, sexual harassment is discrimination in 
employment” prohibited by Title VII). 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)(1); see Eigen et al., supra note 92, at 120 
(examining the Meritor decision). 
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Against this backdrop of commonplace harassment and 
generalized sexism, the Meritor decision marked a momentous 
shift in the law’s treatment of gender-based discrimination.151 
Holding that Title VII prohibited “hostile environment” 
harassment, the Meritor Court stated that this 
antidiscrimination violation occurred when unwelcome 
sex-based mistreatment was sufficiently “severe or pervasive” 
so as “to alter the conditions of [the plaintiff’s] employment.”152 
Monumental, yet vague, the decision left for other courts the 
daunting task of defining terms like “unwelcome” and “severe or 
pervasive.”153 Notwithstanding these ambiguities, however, the 
decision undoubtedly triggered a tectonic shift in Title VII 
jurisprudence.154 In addition to its legal significance, the Meritor 
decision also prompted genuine change in norms and behaviors 
at many American workplaces by abating some of the most 
egregious forms of harassment that were commonplace at the 
time.155  
Despite Meritor’s important advancement of 
antidiscrimination norms, however, the decision also marked 
the initial formulation of the harassment loophole. After 
announcing that Title VII prohibited harassment, a majority of 
the Justices in Meritor explained that they would treat this type 
 
 151. See Noa Ben-Asher, How Is Sex Harassment Discriminatory?, 94 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 25, 25–26 (2018) (discussing the historic 
significance of Meritor).  
 152. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citations 
omitted); see David Sherwyn et al., Don’t Train Your Employees and Cancel 
Your “1-800” Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction 
of the Flaws in the Affirmative Defense to Sexual Harassment Charges, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1265, 1271–72 (2001) (discussing Meritor and examining the 
legal development of sexual harassment law). 
 153. See Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid Pro Quo 
Sexual Harassment, 13 LAW & INEQ. 213, 220–21 (1995) (examining the 
judicial application of Meritor to different types of harassment claims). 
 154. See generally West, supra note 50 (characterizing the Meritor decision 
as “stunning and much-celebrated”). 
 155. See Judith Resnik, The Rights of Remedies, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 247, 252 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 
2003) (discussing the impact of Meritor). 
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of Title VII violation differently than all others.156 The Meritor 
Court acknowledged that under Title VII “courts have 
consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory 
discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or 
not the employer knew, should have known, or approved of the 
supervisor’s actions.”157 Rejecting this long line of cases that had 
attached strict vicarious liability to all other Title VII violations, 
the Meritor Court concluded that agency considerations 
required it to treat hostile work environment claims 
differently.158 Accordingly, over the objection of a vigorous 
dissent, a five-Justice majority in Meritor stated that employers 
were “not always automatically liable for sexual harassment by 
their supervisors.”159 This conclusion stood in stark contrast to 
the D.C. Circuit’s earlier decision in Meritor, which had held 
that any rule other than strict liability would “create an 
enormous loophole in the statute . . . .”160 Disagreeing with the 
D.C. Circuit, the Meritor Court directed lower courts to consider 
underlying agency principles when determining the extent of an 
employer’s responsibility for supervisory harassment.161 
Meritor marked the Supreme Court’s first major 
development of the harassment loophole.162 The Court’s 
distinction between supervisory harassment and other forms of 
harassment confirmed the widely held view that employers 
would never pay for non-supervisory harassment unless firms 
 
 156. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72 (explaining that Congress 
intended “to place some limits on the acts of employees for which employers 
under Title VII are to be held responsible”). 
 157. Id. at 70–71 (citation omitted). 
 158. See id. at 72 (explaining that the legislative “decision to define 
‘employer’ to include any ‘agent’ of an employer” calls on courts “to look to 
agency principles for guidance”). 
 159. Id.; see Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1601 (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on harassment and vicarious employer 
liability). 
 160. Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Miller v. 
Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
 161. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 72. 
 162. See Chamallas, supra note 21, at 1321 (observing that Meritor was 
“the first Supreme Court case to address sexual harassment as a form of sex 
discrimination”). 
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themselves acted negligently.163 As to supervisors, however, 
Meritor’s vague reference to “agency principles” left lower courts 
scrambling to determine the extent of a firm’s legal 
responsibility for supervisory misconduct.164 Reacting to this 
ambiguity, lower courts reached widely divergent conclusions on 
the question.165 Judges in these cases could not agree on which 
“agency principles” to apply or the circumstances, if any, that 
would give rise to strict employer liability for supervisory 
misconduct.166  
After thirteen years of disagreement among the lower 
courts, the Supreme Court returned to the issue of vicarious 
liability in two companion decisions. In Burlington Industries, 
Inc. v. Ellerth167 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,168 the 
Supreme Court announced a new standard for evaluating an 
employer’s obligations to pay for supervisory harassment. 
Adhering to its previous directive in Meritor that courts should 
not hold companies “automatically liable,” the Faragher and 
Ellerth decisions crafted an entirely new affirmative defense 
that did not previously exist under Title VII.169 According to the 
Court, in cases where plaintiffs experienced supervisory 
harassment without suffering tangible employment actions, 
employers enjoyed a defense with two necessary elements: “(a) 
that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and 
 
 163. See id. at 1320–21 (noting that the EEOC’s approach prior to Meritor 
“imposed strict liability for the actions of supervisors and negligence liability 
for all others”).  
 164. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1601–02 (examining the fallout 
from Meritor). 
 165. See Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 273 (asserting that lower courts 
“were in disarray” over the issue of vicarious liability for over a decade 
following Meritor).  
 166. See William R. Corbett, Faragher, Ellerth, and the Federal Law of 
Vicarious Liability for Sexual Harassment by Supervisors: Something Lost, 
Something Gained, and Something to Guard Against, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 801, 808–09 (1999) (discussing the “diversity of approaches” that lower 
courts took on the question of vicarious liability). 
 167. 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
 168. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 169. Id. at 807–08 (offering an affirmative defense to employers when no 
tangible employment action is taken). 
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correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that 
the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of 
any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the 
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”170 
Although Faragher and Ellerth said that this new rule 
imposed “vicarious liability” on employers,171 the defense was 
actually a modified form of negligence liability. A feature of 
agency law, vicarious liability holds employers responsible for 
employees’ bad acts, even when employers exercise all 
reasonable care to prevent misconduct, such as training 
employees and enforcing rules against misbehavior.172 In 
contrast to the no-fault nature of genuine vicarious liability, the 
Faragher-Ellerth defense allowed employers to escape liability 
altogether if they could prove that they acted reasonably and 
that plaintiffs did not.173 The Court customized this 
negligence-based affirmative defense specifically for 
harassment claims, but did not apply it to other Title VII 
violations.174 Although Faragher and Ellerth placed the burden 
of proving a lack of fault on employers, the decisions 
nevertheless announced a fault-based standard through which 
employers could avoid legal exposure to harassment claims by 
 
 170. Id. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; see Heather S. Murr, The 
Continuing Expansive Pressure to Hold Employers Strictly Liable for 
Supervisory Sexual Extortion: An Alternative Approach Based on 
Reasonableness, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 554–55 (2006) (examining the 
Court’s development of the harassment loophole). 
 171. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. 
 172. See Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 132–33 (criticizing courts for 
failing to distinguish between concepts of direct and vicarious liability in the 
harassment context).  
 173. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 177–78 (describing the Faragher 
Court’s “special affirmative defense” that allowed an employer to “escape 
liability if it proved both that it had acted reasonably in taking steps to prevent 
and correct harassment and that the plaintiff had acted unreasonably in 
failing to use the employer’s internal grievance procedure”). 
 174. See id. at 178 (describing the Faragher-Ellerth defense as a “strange 
animal” that was rooted in the Court’s desire to effectuate Title VII policies). 
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focusing on the reasonableness of their responses to victim 
complaints.175 
Fifteen years after Faragher and Ellerth, the Supreme 
Court completed the harassment loophole in a decision that 
shifted the judicial focus away from supervisory harassment to 
coworker harassment. In Vance v. Ball State University,176 the 
Court narrowly defined the meaning of “supervisor” for 
purposes of harassment litigation.177 The Vance Court 
acknowledged that Meritor, Faragher, and Ellerth endorsed 
distinctions between supervisors and non-supervisors.178 
Whereas the Faragher-Ellerth defense required employers to 
prove a lack of negligence for supervisory harassment, the rule 
for coworker harassment required plaintiffs to affirmatively 
establish their employer’s negligence.179 Centering its decision 
on this distinction, the Vance court defined supervisors as 
employees who possess the power to “take tangible employment 
actions against the victim.”180 Under this test, the Vance Court 
suggested that ordinary managers should be treated as 
“coworkers” if they controlled the day-to-day activities of 
subordinates without possessing the power to fire or discipline 
them.181 Applying the “coworker” label to a broader range of 
employees, the Vance Court effectively expanded the 
harassment loophole by requiring more plaintiffs to directly 
prove their employers’ negligence in handling harassment 
complaints.182   
 
 175. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 766–77 (explaining how 
the Faragher-Ellerth defense focused on employer fault).  
 176. 570 U.S. 421 (2013). 
 177. See id. at 424 (“An employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious 
liability under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the employer to take 
tangible employment actions against the victim.”). 
 178. See id. (summarizing different liability rules based on the harasser’s 
identity). 
 179. See id. at 427–28 (stating that liability for coworker harassment 
requires a showing of employer negligence). 
 180. Id. at 450. 
 181. See id. at 434–35 (“[T]he law often contemplates that the ability to 
supervise includes the ability to take tangible employment actions.”). 
 182. Id. at 429–30. 
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Put together, the four major Supreme Court decisions that 
created the harassment loophole—Meritor, Ellerth, Faragher, 
and Vance—all exhibited a remarkable faith in train-and-report 
systems. Whether a plaintiff alleged coworker harassment (thus 
requiring proof of employer negligence) or supervisory 
harassment (thus enabling employers to eliminate liability by 
proving a lack of negligence), the Supreme Court repeatedly 
anchored the harassment loophole in its belief that internal 
reporting systems would effectively prevent and correct 
harassment.183   
For example, the Meritor decision referred positively to 
employer “procedure[s] specifically designed to resolve sexual 
harassment claims.”184 Although Meritor did not specifically 
demarcate the legal effect that these procedures would have on 
harassment claims, the Court fully endorsed train-and-report 
systems in Faragher and Ellerth.185 Both decisions predicted 
that internal schemes would encourage “forethought by 
employers and saving action by objecting employees.”186 In 
essence, the Justices in these cases assumed that by limiting 
employer liability, the Court would encourage victims to come 
forward and employers to thwart harassment.187  
More recently, the Vance Court emphasized the importance 
of train-and-report systems in combating coworker 
harassment.188 Anticipating criticism that its decision would 
 
 183. See Schultz et al., supra note 47, at 42 (arguing that under Faragher 
and Ellerth, “victims of hostile work environment harassment . . . must first 
report the harassment to the employer through its internal complaint process 
or else risk losing later in court”). 
 184. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 71 (1986) (citations 
omitted). 
 185. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 (1998) 
(explaining that employers will “have greater opportunity and incentive to 
screen” supervisors, “train them, and monitor their performance”). 
 186. Id. at 807; Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998). 
 187. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 786–87 (questioning the 
Supreme Court’s empirical assumptions in Faragher and Ellerth). 
 188. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 449 (2013) (stating that 
negligence liability for coworker harassment would not “‘relieve[] scores of 
employers of responsibility’ for the behavior of workers they employ”(citations 
omitted)). 
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expose workers to managerial harassment, the Vance Court 
wrote:  
A plaintiff could still prevail by showing that his or her 
employer was negligent in failing to prevent harassment 
from taking place. Evidence that an employer did not 
monitor the workplace, failed to respond to complaints, failed 
to provide a system for registering complaints, or effectively 
discouraged complaints from being filed would be 
relevant.189   
Thus, just as the Court spoke to the power of internal reporting 
schemes to address supervisory harassment in Faragher and 
Ellerth, the Vance Court approved of these same systems to 
combat coworker harassment.190 This prediction of harassment 
prevention— embedded in each holding —assumed that the 
harassment loophole would prompt victims to come forward and 
share their harassment stories with employers.  
B.  Contesting the Loophole: Enduring Harassment Despite 
Internal Reporting Systems 
Over thirty years have passed since the Supreme Court first 
recognized sexual harassment as a Title VII violation.191 Over 
twenty years have passed since the Court defined the contours 
of the harassment loophole by assuming that train-and-report 
systems would curb sexual harassment.192 Since that time, 
employers have offered their workers numerous trainings, 
handbooks, and other mechanisms to address workplace sexual 
misconduct.193 As noted above, #MeToo has only intensified this 
trend, with employers expanding their internal antiharassment 
 
 189. Id. at 448–49. 
 190. See id. (asserting that a negligence-based liability standard for 
coworker harassment still holds employers responsible for monitoring 
workplace interactions). 
 191. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. 
 192. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765–66.  
 193. See Zakaria, supra note 5 (“[T]he incentive behind creating an 
anti-sexual-harassment policy, having trainings, and even instituting an 
in-house reporting mechanism, became . . . more about evading liability by 
meeting the criteria of the ‘affirmative defense . . . .’”). 
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schemes in response to the movement.194 Yet today, after 
decades of experience with train-and-report systems, the 
#MeToo movement has shown how harassers often operate with 
impunity even at workplaces with robust internal reporting 
systems.195 The fact that harassment endures despite decades of 
training suggests that today’s renewed corporate calls for more 
reporting schemes will reduce employer liability, without 
necessarily reducing harassment itself.  
1.  High Rates of Harassment in the Wake of #MeToo  
Even though the Supreme Court predicted that the 
harassment loophole would combat harassment by incentivizing 
victim reporting and employer policing, evidence from the 
#MeToo movement has challenged these assumptions. The “too” 
of “#MeToo” not only signaled a shared solidarity among 
victims, it also emphasized the ongoing commonness of 
harassment.196 Emerging statistics from #MeToo point to the 
breadth of the problem. For example, between 2017 and 2018, 
the EEOC reported a 13 percent increase in sexual harassment 
charges and a 23 percent increase in the agency’s finding of 
reasonable cause to believe accusers who filed claims.197   
Although the uptick in sexual harassment filings provides 
tangible evidence that #MeToo has raised awareness about the 
problem, it is difficult to estimate the precise rate of sexual 
harassment at worksites.198 For instance, the EEOC’s 
comprehensive study on the subject concluded that anywhere 
from 25 percent to 85 percent of women “report having 
 
 194. See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing corporate reaction to the #MeToo 
movement). 
 195. See West, supra note 50 (contrasting the historic nature of the Meritor 
decision with the modern workplace realities that #MeToo has revealed). 
 196. See Soucek, supra note 58, at 72 (characterizing #MeToo as “a 
movement built on repetition”). 
 197. See EEOC, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW, supra note 85 (summarizing 
reporting and enforcement statistics). 
 198. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 70 (discussing unreported incidents 
of harassment). 
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experienced sexual harassment in the workplace.”199 The agency 
attributes this wide range in estimates to differences in survey 
methodologies.200 But despite the variance in these numbers, 
nearly all estimates indicate that harassment remains a 
widespread problem and that harassers often work at 
companies with well-developed train-and-report systems.201 
Of course, today’s high rate of harassment does not 
necessarily mean that training and reporting have failed 
altogether. It is possible that the problem of sexual harassment 
would be worse if such systems were not in place. But there is 
virtually no social science data to support this proposition.202 
For example, the EEOC recently reviewed a number of studies 
on sexual harassment trainings and found insufficient evidence 
to substantiate the use of these systems standing alone.203 
Similarly, other studies have also failed to show a demonstrable 
decline in sexual harassment, even as more employers have 
adopted antiharassment policies.204 Given the lack of empirical 
justification for these schemes, it is quite remarkable that 
harassment liability and a multibillion-dollar training industry 
all hinge on the presumption that train-and-report systems 
effectively prevent harassment.205 In addition, the reluctance of 
victims to come forward has cast doubt on the Supreme Court’s 
 
 199. See CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EEOC, SELECT TASK 
FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (June 2016), https://
perma.cc/67XA-K3EJ (offering recommendations to stop and prevent 
workplace harassment). 
 200. See id. (explaining that reporting results depend on whether 
researchers use convenience samples or probability samples). 
 201. See Zakaria, supra note 5 (questioning the effectiveness of 
antiharassment systems). 
 202. See Schultz et al., supra note 47, at 42–43 (stating that the lack of 
evidence in support of reporting schemes is “unsurprising”).  
 203. See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 199 (discussing the limitations of 
harassment training, standing alone); Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 63–64 
(reporting on the significance of the EEOC’s findings). 
 204. See Nuñez, supra note 133, at 487–88 (summarizing analyses on the 
effectiveness of internal reporting systems). 
 205. See Krieger, supra note 36, at 174–75 (critiquing the harassment 
loophole for ignoring studies on victim behavior). 
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prediction that the harassment loophole would trigger 
widespread reporting.206  
2.  Ongoing Victim Silence and Retaliation  
In addition to exposing the continuing reality of harassment 
in American workplaces, the #MeToo movement also has helped 
explain why victims endure workplace harassment rather than 
utilize their employers’ internal systems. Common victim 
responses to harassment include downplaying the gravity of the 
situation, enduring the behavior, or avoiding the harasser.207 In 
fact, studies on this issue indicate that filing an internal report 
remains the least likely response of harassment victims.208 
Thus, even though the Supreme Court crafted the harassment 
loophole with the hope that encouraging internal reporting 
would lead to meaningful change, the reality is that victims 
rarely seek any kind of formal, organizational relief.209  
As a threshold matter, it is unclear why the Supreme Court 
ever assumed that limiting liability would influence victim 
behavior in this way. After all, most workers have never heard 
of the harassment loophole, so they are unlikely to know that 
they must first utilize their employers’ reporting systems to 
preserve their harassment claims in court.210 Beyond simply not 
knowing about the legal consequences of failing to report, 
however, there are many other compelling reasons why 
 
 206. See Schultz et al., supra note 47, at 42–43 (“[R]equiring victims to 
report sexual harassment through internal complaint processes discourages 
them from challenging harassment at all.”). 
 207. See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 199 (reporting that roughly 
three-quarters of individuals who experience harassment never talk to a 
supervisor, manager, or union representative about the harassment). 
 208. See Grossman, supra note 22, at 23 (summarizing studies on the 
responses of harassment victims); Krieger, supra note 36, at 181–82 (“By far, 
across a variety of studies spanning a number of years and a range of 
occupations, the least frequent response to sexualized workplace conduct 
involves . . . bringing a formal complaint against the harasser.”). 
 209. See Krieger, supra note 36, at 182–83 (examining reporting rates of 
harassment victims). 
 210. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 787–88 (criticizing the 
Supreme Court’s assumptions about victim-reporting incentives). 
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harassment victims do not come forward. Research increasingly 
shows that training systems can generate backlash, without 
necessarily combating gender-based mistreatment at work.211 
In the worst case scenarios, internal reporting schemes can 
actually facilitate misconduct.212 Take, for instance, many 
prominent #MeToo stories in which complaint procedures and 
confidential settlement agreements helped conceal problems, 
while enabling high-level harassers to keep their jobs.213 
Likewise, the results of internal investigations often 
characterize disputes as “personal conflicts” between 
individuals, while absolving employers of responsibility for any 
broader systemic shortcomings.214 Beyond failing to 
substantiate victims’ claims, internal investigations can turn 
the tables on victims and lead to punishment.215 Studies on the 
issue show that victims who report misconduct frequently 
experience retaliation, both in overt ways such as discharge and 
in more subtle forms such as receiving negative performance 
evaluations.216 
Given these dynamics, it is unsurprising that victims rarely 
come forward to officially report harassment. Today, an 
estimated 87 to 94 percent of individuals who experience 
harassment never file formal complaints.217 Because the 
 
 211. See Green, supra note 6, at 166–67 (discussing the risk of focusing 
exclusively on train-and-report systems in response to the #MeToo 
movement). 
 212. See Beiner, supra note 12, at 117 (asserting that the harassment 
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harassment loophole requires employers to address only 
reported instances of misconduct, notice-based liability 
automatically relieves firms of legal responsibility in the vast 
majority of cases.  
For the small percentage of harassment victims who 
actually utilize their employers’ formal systems, courts still 
absolve firms of liability if employers resolve disputes after 
victims complain.218 The Supreme Court never intended for 
courts to apply the harassment loophole so broadly. The 
Faragher-Ellerth defense described “two necessary elements” 
that required employers to prove both that they exercised due 
care and that the victim unreasonably failed to complain.219 
According to a straightforward application of this test, courts 
should hold employers automatically liable for all verified 
complaints about supervisory harassment because, under such 
circumstances, employers cannot satisfy the second element of 
the defense that requires proof of employee silence.220 Likewise, 
a true application of the first element would lead courts to 
scrutinize the effectiveness of an employer’s policy to determine 
whether a firm’s internal system actually prevented 
harassment. In practice, however, courts frequently decline to 
adhere to these mandates.221 Instead, judges often accept a 
company’s antiharassment policy on paper or decline to punish 
employers that respond to complaints, even though defendants 
in such circumstances cannot prove that victims unreasonably 
 
statistics and the reporting rates of individuals who experience harassment); 
Porter, supra note 7, at 51–52 (summarizing recent data on victim reporting).  
 218. See Eigen et al., supra note 92, at 133–34 (explaining how courts 
absolve “well-behaved employers” of liability even when victims reasonably 
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 219. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) 
(detailing the two elements that compromise the affirmative defense); see also 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Murr, supra note 
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stayed silent.222 The net result of this dynamic is that employers 
can adopt cosmetic policies that prohibit harassment, without 
taking more meaningful actions to deter it.223 
In sum, the Supreme Court developed the harassment 
loophole by making numerous empirical suppositions that the 
#MeToo movement has undercut. By requiring employees to 
process their harassment complaints through a firm’s internal 
system, the Court tried to incentivize cooperative behavior 
between victims and employers. Pointing to the enduring nature 
of harassment, however, #MeToo has demonstrated that many 
employers technically adhere to the letter of the Court’s 
mandate, while still tolerating high levels of harassment at 
their worksites.224 In light of these outcomes, a new rule of 
liability should increase employers’ incentives for actually 
curbing workplace harassment, thereby advancing one of the 
Court’s primary goals when it first created the harassment 
loophole.  
III.  STRICT EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR HARASSMENT 
Employers should pay for all forms of employee 
harassment, regardless of company fault. Given the harassment 
loophole’s failure to effectively curtail harassment, businesses 
should not escape liability simply by enacting train-and-report 
systems. At first glance, such a shift in liability rules—from the 
status quo of limited employer responsibility to a requirement 
of strict liability—might seem unfair to employers that 
reasonably attempt to prevent and correct misconduct.225 For 
 
 222. See id. at 1266–67 (explaining how the affirmative defense may create 
incentives for employers to “exercise just enough reasonable care to satisfy a 
court, but not enough to make it easy or comfortable for employees to complain 
of workplace harassment”). 
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instance, ever since the Supreme Court created the harassment 
loophole, firms have publicized “zero tolerance” policies, 
provided victims with reporting opportunities, and punished 
harassers in response to complaints.226 Although many of these 
efforts constitute forms of cosmetic compliance,227 even when 
firms make genuine attempts to correct misconduct, this Part 
explains why they should still pay for harassment.   
A rule of strict employer liability would better comport with 
the goals and doctrinal underpinnings of agency law and Title 
VII. When the Supreme Court announced the core components 
of the harassment loophole in 1998, it based much of its opinion 
on a specific provision of agency law that was abandoned eight 
years later when the Restatement of Agency was updated.228 In 
addition, many courts that apply agency rules require 
employers to pay for intentional employee misconduct, even 
when firms have done nothing wrong and even when employees 
violate explicit work prohibitions.229   
Just as the law of agency has changed since the Supreme 
Court created the harassment loophole, so too have social 
judgments about a firm’s responsibility to prevent harassment. 
When the Court created the loophole, it acknowledged that 
social attitudes about an employer’s responsibility for employee 
transgressions might evolve. As an example, the Faragher 
Court cited the shift in views about employees who smoke: “We 
simply understand smoking differently now and have revised 
the old judgments about what ought to be done about it.”230 
 
 226. See MARSHALL, supra note 19, at 47 (describing a “feeding frenzy 
among human resources professionals” to offer employers antiharassment 
policies and procedures). 
 227. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 74 (criticizing the standalone use of 
antiharassment training and policies).  
 228. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759–61 (1998). 
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2)(d) (AM. L. INST. 1957) 
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Analogizing this example to harassment, the Court recognized 
that agency law could theoretically characterize harassment “as 
one of the costs of doing business.”231 Although the Court 
declined to hold employers responsible for harassment in 1998, 
the force behind the #MeToo movement demonstrates that 
society has “revised the old judgments about what ought to be 
done about it.”232 
A shift to strict employer liability would not only reflect 
changes in agency law and on-the-ground realities, it would also 
harmonize harassment jurisprudence with the rest of Title VII. 
Courts hold employers strictly liable for all Title VII violations, 
except for harassment.233 For example, employers must pay for 
discriminatory hirings, firings, promotions, and demotions, 
even when firms have trained employees not to discriminate, 
enacted antidiscrimination rules, and taken reasonable steps to 
prevent these unlawful acts.234 Companies remain liable in 
these circumstances not because they bear any direct blame for 
the discrimination but because automatic liability ensures that 
victims will receive compensation, while providing greater 
incentives for firms to enact genuine prophylactic measures.235 
These goals of compensation and deterrence—rooted in both 
Title VII and agency law—are best served when courts require 
employers to pay for predictable employee misconduct, even 
when firms try to prevent these bad acts. Just as blameless 
employers must pay for discriminatory discharges, so too should 
firms pay for the far-reaching forms of employee harassment 
that #MeToo has revealed. 
 
 231. Id. at 798. 
 232. Id. at 797. 
 233. See Grover, supra note 9, at 810–11 (outlining Title VII’s vicarious 
liability distinctions). 
 234. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 761–62 (contrasting the 
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A.  The Supreme Court, Title VII, and Agency Law 
A product of agency law, “vicarious liability” requires 
defendants to pay for the wrongful acts of others.236 In the 
employment context, the most common form of vicarious 
liability is known as “respondeat superior,” which holds 
employers liable for torts that employees commit in the scope of 
their employment.237 As a vicarious form of responsibility, 
respondeat superior does not depend on employer fault.238 Thus, 
businesses often must pay for employee misconduct even when 
employers properly supervise workers, issue warnings, and 
enact rules against misconduct.239  
When the Supreme Court announced the core components 
of the harassment loophole in Faragher and Ellerth, it turned to 
the Restatement (Second) of Agency—written in 1957—for 
guidance.240 The Ellerth Court analogized sexual harassment to 
an intentional tort and observed that under limited 
circumstances agency law holds masters responsible for their 
servants’ intentional torts.241 For example, employers must pay 
for harms caused by employees who engage in intentional 
misconduct “to serve the employer.”242 Applying this principle to 
Title VII, the Ellerth Court found that the “serve the employer” 
test did not apply to harassment claims because sexual 
harassers rarely act to promote the interests of their firms.243 
 
 236. See Sykes, supra note 11, at 563 (defining the boundaries of vicarious 
employer liability). 
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Instead, the Ellerth Court found that harassers act on “personal 
motives” or “sexual urges.”244  
But the Faragher opinion—issued on the same day as 
Ellerth—acknowledged that courts do not always use the “serve 
the employer” test to make vicarious liability determinations.245 
In fact, the Faragher Court recognized a broad split in agency 
law on the question of a firm’s vicarious responsibility for 
intentional employee misconduct. For example, the opinion 
highlighted a string of cases that extended employer liability to 
“intentional torts that were in no sense inspired by any purpose 
to serve the employer.”246 To illustrate this point, the Court cited 
a famous Second Circuit opinion that attached vicarious liability 
to the Coast Guard for a drunken sailor’s intentional flooding of 
a drydock.247 Even though the sailor acted without any 
motivation to serve his employer, the Second Circuit held that 
the Coast Guard should nevertheless pay for the resulting 
damages because “a business enterprise cannot justly disclaim 
responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be 
characteristic of its activities.”248   
Declining to reconcile these apparently conflicting agency 
decisions, the Faragher Court observed that, at its core, agency 
law reflected societal views about the costs that employers 
should fairly bear for employee transgressions.249 The Court 
stated that expanding these costs to new activities depended on 
whether “the servant’s acts should be considered as one of the 
normal risks to be borne by the business in which the servant is 
employed.”250 Applying the standard to sexual harassment, the 
 
 244. Id. at 756–59.  
 245. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 795–96 (1998) 
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Faragher Court determined that society did not yet characterize 
supervisory harassment as such a cost.251 
Critically, both the Faragher and Ellerth opinions left open 
the possibility that shifts in agency law could eventually expand 
the limits of an employer’s vicarious responsibility for 
harassment.252 The Ellerth Court noted that the vicarious 
liability rule that it relied upon was “a developing feature of 
agency law.”253 Likewise, although it declined to adopt a rule of 
strict liability for supervisory harassment, the Faragher Court 
recognized that courts could characterize this type of 
harassment “as one of the costs of doing business” and that 
“developments like this occur from time to time in the law of 
agency.”254 As the next section demonstrates, agency law has 
evolved since the Court decided Faragher and Ellerth, with 
courts increasingly holding employers responsible for various 
forms of intentional employee misconduct. This “developing 
feature of agency law” should extend to sexual harassment as 
well.255 
B.  Broadening Vicarious Liability Based on Agency 
Developments 
The Supreme Court anchored the harassment loophole in a 
provision of agency law that no longer exists. Both the Faragher 
and Ellerth Courts cited extensively to the Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d), which asked whether a servant 
was “aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the 
agency relation.”256 Relying on this provision, the Faragher 
Court held that supervisors were most clearly aided by their 
supervisory relationship when they took adverse job actions 
against subordinates.257 Conversely, the Court held that if 
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supervisors took no such action, then companies could escape 
liability through train-and-report systems.258 
But as the Faragher Court predicted, this standard of 
agency law has evolved since the Court created the harassment 
loophole.259 Eight years after the Faragher Court made the 
“aided in accomplishing” test the centerpiece of the harassment 
loophole, the American Law Institute (ALI) abandoned the 
standard altogether.260 According to the ALI, the original 
drafters of the Second Restatement likely intended the “aided in 
accomplishing” language to apply only to instances of apparent 
authority.261 If true, such a change in the meaning of “aided in 
accomplishing” would dramatically affect harassment 
jurisprudence. If limited only to circumstances in which 
supervisors have apparent authority to harass, then the “aided 
in accomplishing” test would rarely apply to Title VII cases. 
Apparent authority exists when plaintiffs reasonably believe 
that agents possess authority to engage in certain acts.262 Given 
the prevalence of antiharassment policies in contemporary 
workplaces, plaintiffs today would seldom possess any sort of 
reasonable belief that their employers authorized their 
supervisors to harass them.   
The Restatement of Employment Law recently confirmed 
this shift in modern agency law.263 The Restatement explained 
that the “aided in accomplishing” test should not apply to 
employment settings because “[a]lmost all torts in the 
employment relationship are ‘aided’ by the existence of that 
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relationship.”264 Given the apparent boundlessness of the “aided 
in accomplishing” standard and the fact that the Restatement 
of Agency discarded the test, the Restatement of Employment 
Law now directs courts to ask simply whether workers commit 
torts within the scope of their employment.265  
Many courts today still hold that intentional torts occur 
outside the scope of employment.266 But even the Faragher 
Court recognized the sharp division in agency law on this 
question.267 Competing with the traditional approach that 
declines to apply vicarious liability to intentional employee 
offenses, many contemporary agency decisions hold employers 
responsible for intentional employee wrongdoing.268 Courts offer 
varying rationales for this shift, but many simply utilize a 
broader definition of “scope of employment” and hold that firms 
must pay even for their employees’ intentional acts.269 
Consider a hypothetical example of strict employer liability 
for intentional employee wrongdoing: A fast food restaurant 
instructs its employee to mop the floor before the end of her 
shift.270 The restaurant trained the employee on safe mopping 
techniques, directed her to warn customers about wet floors, 
and punished employees who broke these rules. If the employee 
uses too much water or otherwise mops negligently, nearly all 
courts would require her employer to compensate customers for 
their injuries.271 But assume that a customer is injured not 
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the question of vicarious employer liability for intentional torts). 
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 271. See Krieger, supra note 36, at 196–97 (examining respondeat superior 
liability for intentional misconduct). 
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because of the employee’s negligence, but because she 
intentionally strikes a customer. For instance, imagine that a 
customer makes a snarky remark after the mopper’s warning. 
In response, the employee hits the impolite customer over the 
head with her mop.272 In many jurisdictions, the restaurant 
would still have to pay for the assault even though the assault 
certainly did not serve the employer’s interests.273 Courts 
applying strict vicarious liability under such circumstances 
would note that the assault occurred on company time, on 
company property, and while the employee performed job duties 
(i.e., mopping and warning).274 Although employees certainly 
are not hired to harm third parties, agency law frequently 
requires firms to pay for such damages anyway.  
In the Title VII context, courts consistently hold employers 
strictly liable for discriminatory acts other than harassment, 
despite the fact that such intentional employee misconduct does 
not advance the firm’s interests.275 For example, if a supervisor 
engages in race-based hiring or a religious-based firing, the fact 
that a company has instituted policies that prohibit this illegal 
behavior does not immunize the firm from liability.276 The 
discriminating employee acts within the scope of employment, 
even though these acts do not serve the employer’s interests, but 
actually harm them.277 Antidiscrimination law holds firms 
vicariously responsible in these circumstances when 
supervisors mingle authorized conduct (i.e., their hire-fire 
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power) with prohibited conduct (i.e., discrimination).278 Under 
this view, it is not the discriminatory act that serves the 
employer’s purpose, but instead the work duty that accompanies 
the bad act.279 As long as the supervisor performs work functions 
that serve the employer’s interests, the employer is liable even 
if the supervisor performs those functions in a discriminatory 
manner. 
Applying the foregoing principles to harassment, the test 
for employer liability should consider the relationship between 
a wrongdoer’s job-related acts and the wrong itself.280 Under 
this framework, the question is not whether a firm specifically 
hired an individual to harass employees.281 Instead, the 
question is whether the harasser engaged in harassing 
behaviors while simultaneously performing job duties.282 The 
Restatement of Employment Law refers to “unratified acts 
committed within, or incident to, work that the employer 
assigned . . . .”283 The same query applies to sexual harassment. 
Courts should conclude that harassment falls within the scope 
of employment when a harasser entwines his job performance 
with harassing acts. Consider, for example, a supervisor who 
emails an agenda for an upcoming company meeting to his 
female coworker. The male employee has specific job 
responsibilities that include drafting the agenda, sending the 
email, and attending the meeting itself. In the course of 
performing these job duties, the male employee also emails dirty 
jokes, makes sexual propositions, or physically grabs the female 
coworker during the company meeting. Each of these actions 
 
 278. See id. at 78 (outlining various rationales for holding masters 
vicariously liable for their servants’ wrongful acts). 
 279. See id. at 86 (discussing scenarios in which “sexual harassment is 
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 283. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2015). 
 
206 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 155 (2021) 
 
mixes the supervisor’s authorized functions with harassing 
behavior.284   
Beyond examining the connection between job duties and 
committed wrongs, many courts also hold firms vicariously 
responsible for employee misconduct when the employment 
relationship increases the risk of harm or if the harm is a 
predictable hazard of work.285 Some courts have adopted this 
alternative approach to vicarious liability by asking whether “in 
the context of the employer’s particular enterprise, the 
employee’s conduct is not so unusual or startling that it seems 
unfair to include the loss resulting from it in the employer’s 
business costs.”286 According to this view, questions of vicarious 
liability should focus on the broad issues of risk-creation and 
foreseeability.287 The more that an endeavor enhances certain 
risks, the more likely that the firm should pay for the 
foreseeable costs generated by those risks.288 As the 
Restatement of Employment Law says, “[b]ecause the employer 
generally benefits from the employee’s actions taken within the 
scope of employment, the employer should bear the costs that 
the actions wrongly impose on third parties.”289 
Companies pay damages in these circumstances not 
because they can always prevent misconduct, but because 
society expects firms that reap economic benefits from their 
activities to assume responsibility for the predictable costs of 
those activities.290 The firm does not assume responsibility for 
 
 284. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 298 (examining different ways that 
an employee’s bad act could nevertheless advance an employer’s interests). 
 285. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 144–46 (discussing foreseeability 
and “enterprise” risk theories of vicarious liability). 
 286. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2006) 
(acknowledging that some courts utilize this alternative formulation of 
vicarious liability but criticizing the standard’s breadth). 
 287. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 144–46 (examining the relationship 
between vicarious liability, foreseeability, and the creation of risk). 
 288. See id. at 157–58 (contrasting enterprise risk theory with the more 
“antiquated” standard that bases vicarious employer liability on the 
tortfeasor’s motives). 
 289. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.03 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2015). 
 290. See Krieger, supra note 36, at 196–97 (considering the normative 
rationales for vicarious employer liability). 
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all theoretical costs, but only for foreseeable categories of harm 
that courts can fairly attribute to the workplace.291 Applied to 
sexual harassment claims, the #MeToo movement has drawn 
critical public attention to rampant levels of harassment across 
many industries.292 Considering this reality, courts can fairly 
characterize sexual harassment as a category of harm that 
typically arises out of workplace dynamics and work-specific 
settings.293 Supervisors and coworkers frequently harass one 
another in company spaces (e.g., offices, cubicles, break rooms, 
etc.) using company venues (e.g., interviews, meetings, email 
servers, etc.) on company time (e.g., during business hours, work 
trips, etc.). Although employers may not always foresee specific 
incidents of harassment and may take reasonable steps to 
prevent harassment, the prevalence and work-specific setting of 
harassing acts enable employers to predict these harms and, 
accordingly, justify requiring firms to compensate victims when 
they occur.  
C.  Extending Liability to Coworker Harassment 
Most discussions of vicarious employer liability have 
focused exclusively on supervisory harassment. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court’s core decisions that formulated the harassment 
loophole—Meritor, Faragher, and Ellerth—all involved sexual 
harassment by supervisors.294 Only the most recent addition to 
 
 291. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 301 (discussing the concepts of 
foreseeability and enterprise causation in relation to vicarious liability). 
 292. See supra Part I.A.  
 293. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 140 (“[P]ower dynamics and 
structural features of the workplace . . . facilitate sexual abuse . . . .”). 
 294. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998) (stating 
that two of Faragher’s supervisors allegedly subjected Faragher and other 
females to unwanted touching and lewd remarks); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 747 (1998) (“During [Ellerth’s] employment, she alleges, 
she was subjected to constant sexual harassment by her supervisor.”); Meritor 
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 59–60 (1986) (summarizing Vinson’s 
allegations that she was continually subjected to sexual harassment by the 
vice president). 
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the canon—Vance—involved coworker harassment.295 
Mirroring the disproportionate attention that courts have paid 
to supervisory harassment, legal scholarship on the issue has 
concentrated on the misconduct of supervisors, as opposed to 
coworkers.296 This lack of attention paid to coworker 
harassment is understandable given the widely held 
presumption that only supervisors who fire or take other 
tangible actions against workers can expose companies to 
vicarious liability.297  
Despite the dearth of analysis on this issue, however, 
closing the harassment loophole should include holding 
businesses liable for all forms of employee harassment, whether 
committed by supervisors or coworkers. The doctrinal 
underpinnings of Title VII and agency law support this broader 
approach to vicarious liability.298 Courts presently apply a 
negligence standard when analyzing employer responsibility for 
coworker harassment.299 According to this liability test, firms 
become liable for coworker harassment only if employers knew 
or should have known about the harassment and acted 
unreasonably in response.300 This standard, of course, is a form 
 
 295. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 424–25 (2013) (explaining 
that a fellow employee continually harassed Vance despite University efforts 
to address the situation). 
 296. See, e.g., Carrillo, supra note 15, at 53–54; Grossman, supra note 30, 
at 735–36 (proposing a rule of strict employer liability for supervisory 
harassment); Phillips, supra note 26, at 1268–69 (same). But see Fisk & 
Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 788–89 (discussing coworker harassment and 
vicarious liability); Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 107–08 (same). 
 297. See Katherine S. Anderson, Note, Employer Liability Under Title VII 
for Sexual Harassment After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 87 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1258, 1261–62 (1987) (noting that courts have never held firms 
vicariously liable for coworker harassment). 
 298. See, e.g., Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 107–08 (“Limiting vicarious 
liability to incidents of supervisorial harassment is an improper application of 
the law of agency.”). 
 299. See Grossman, supra note 30, at 689–90 (discussing the difference 
between direct and vicarious liability). 
 300. See Corbett, supra note 166, at 811–12 (summarizing the standard of 
liability for coworker harassment). 
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of direct liability, not vicarious liability.301 The firm becomes 
liable through its own unreasonable response to harassment, as 
opposed to becoming automatically liable for coworker conduct, 
regardless of company fault.302   
If a broader approach to agency law places supervisory 
harassment within the scope of employment, then the same 
rationale logically applies to coworker harassment as well.303 
Nothing in agency law limits vicarious liability only to official 
supervisory acts. After all, in the tort context, courts regularly 
hold companies responsible for the misconduct of their 
nonsupervisory personnel. For example, the waiter who 
intentionally pours coffee on a customer can trigger automatic 
liability for his employer, regardless of his nonsupervisory 
status and regardless of the employer’s response.304 The same is 
true if a school janitor attacks a member of the public.305 The 
janitor’s lack of supervisory functions would have little bearing 
on the school’s responsibility to pay for damages that the janitor 
causes.306 Many courts would apply vicarious liability in these 
circumstances because agency law covers all 
employees— supervisors, high-level managers, and ordinary 
employees—who commit torts within the scope of their 
employment.307  
 
 301. See Sykes, supra note 11, at 578 (asserting that a liability standard 
based on an employer’s negligence “is not really vicarious at all”). 
 302. See id. at 577 (noting that a true form of “strict” liability prohibits 
employers from defending against actions based on the reasonableness of their 
responses). 
 303. See Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 108 (outlining situations in which 
employers should pay for employees’ intentional misconduct). 
 304. See Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 274 (explaining that many courts 
hold employers vicariously liable for intentional employee torts). 
 305. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 292–93 (using the hypothetical 
example of a violent employee to illustrate certain rules of vicarious liability).  
 306. See id. at 293–94 (discussing employer liability for intentional torts 
of employees). 
 307. See Phillips, supra note 26, at 1244–46 (examining the application of 
agency law to different categories of workers); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF AGENCY § 7.07 (AM. L. INST. 2006) (defining employer-employee 
relationships). 
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The Supreme Court has already stated that if supervisory 
harassment falls within the scope of employment, then coworker 
harassment should as well. For example, the Faragher Court 
explicitly found that the “rationale for placing harassment 
within the scope of supervisory authority . . . would apply when 
the behavior was that of coemployees.”308 Likewise, the Ellerth 
Court observed that a broad view of vicarious liability would 
extend to coworkers because the employment relationship 
provides coworkers with “[p]roximity,” “regular contact” and “a 
captive pool of potential victims.”309 Of course, the Faragher and 
Ellerth opinions concluded that harassing behavior—whether 
committed by supervisors or coworkers—generally did not fall 
within the scope of employment.310 But as explained above, 
changes in agency law and in societal perceptions of harassment 
have altered this calculus.  
Like supervisors who harass subordinates while exercising 
their hire-fire authority, coworkers frequently interweave job 
duties with gender-based harassment.311 Harassers often 
behave opportunistically, and the workplace can help facilitate 
this misconduct.312 Coworkers operate in the same physical 
space, collaborate with fellow employees, and share repeated 
encounters.313 As the entity that benefits from these 
interactions, employers should pay for the harassment-related 
costs that arise from them, even if the firm has acted reasonably 
to prevent misconduct.314 Coworkers are as much a part of the 
productive process as supervisors.315 Whereas, the Supreme 
 
 308. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 800 (1998). 
 309. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 760 (1998). 
 310. See supra notes 166–170 and accompanying text. 
 311. See Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 107–08 (examining the 
relationship between harassment, job performance, and agency law). 
 312. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 159 (discussing certain reasons why 
harassment is “job-related”). 
 313. See Jane E. Larson, Sexual Labor, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 129, 132 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 
2003) (discussing repeat interactions between workers). 
 314. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 186 (outlining the relationship 
between vicarious liability and risk-creation). 
 315. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 304–05 (examining how rationales 
based on causation and foreseeability support a broad application of vicarious 
liability). 
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Court determined in 1998 that harassment falls outside the 
scope of employment, the #MeToo movement has shown how 
harassers today regularly fuse harassing behaviors with normal 
job activities. The predictability and frequency of harassment 
mean that this form of misbehavior often falls within the scope 
of employment for supervisors and coworkers alike. Just as 
firms must pay for harms when supervisors perform job 
functions in a discriminatory way—regardless of 
company-specific preventative measures—firms should also 
absorb the costs that coworkers generate when they perform job 
functions in a harassing manner.  
D.  Achieving Agency and Antidiscrimination Goals 
Adopting the proposal outlined here would not only 
represent a doctrinally sound application of agency law and 
Title VII, it would also serve the underlying goals of both bodies 
of law. In the tort context, vicarious liability incentivizes 
deterrence measures, helps compensate victims, and shifts 
losses from plaintiffs to employers and the public.316 Similarly, 
Title VII’s objectives include providing redress to victims and 
inducing employers to root out discriminatory actions at their 
worksites.317 Just as vicarious liability spreads losses among 
stakeholders and prompts group investment in underlying 
problems, Title VII characterizes discrimination as a societal 
harm that damages the public at large.318 
In contrast to the harassment loophole, a rule of strict 
employer liability can effectively promote these objectives. For 
example, an employer’s deterrence incentives would 
 
 316. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 786 (comparing the core 
goals of Title VII and vicarious liability in tort law).  
 317. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 850 (2001) 
(discussing Title VII’s remedial scheme and purpose); Mark S. Brodin, The 
Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy 
Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 317–18 (1982) (examining Title VII’s 
objectives).  
 318. See David J. Willbrand, Better Late Than Never? The Function and 
Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 64 
U. CIN. L. REV. 617, 622 (1996) (explaining how Title VII helps serve broad 
public policy objectives). 
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dramatically change if firms always had to pay for employee 
harassment. As noted above, the Supreme Court premised much 
of the harassment loophole on the empirical bet that limiting 
employer liability would prompt firms to prevent harassment.319 
In reality, though, the harassment loophole has provided 
employers with the perverse incentive to ignore harassment 
until it officially comes to their attention.320 Given that 
companies currently have no reason to investigate workplace 
harassment until victims officially object, the loophole 
encourages firms to make it quite difficult for victims to file 
complaints, even while publicly taking a “zero tolerance” stance 
against harassment.321 In fact, the loophole provides 
litigation-conscious employers with an incentive to draft 
minimally-compliant harassment policies that functionally 
discourage employees from actually using them.322 
In contrast to the status quo, a system that forced 
employers to absorb the costs of harassment would induce firms 
to take more meaningful steps to prevent harassment.323 
Attaching liability to a predefined set of harms provides 
businesses with incentives to prevent those harms.324 Thus, if 
employers had to pay for harassment, regardless of whether 
victims complained, rational firms would attempt to minimize 
their legal exposure to this category of harm by discovering 
 
 319. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (stating 
that the primary objective of Title VII is “not to provide redress but to avoid 
harm” (citation omitted)). 
 320. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 85–86 (arguing that strict employer 
liability would encourage employers to “take the strongest possible affirmative 
measure to prevent the hiring and retention of sexist supervisors”). 
 321. See Grace S. Ho, Not Quite Rights: How the Unwelcomeness Element 
in Sexual Harassment Law Undermines Title VII’s Transformative Potential, 
20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 131, 142–43 (2008) (discussing the ramifications of 
notice-based harassment liability). 
 322. See id. (examining the incentives created by the harassment 
loophole). 
 323. See Verkerke, supra note 10, at 307–08 (outlining the relationship 
between enterprise liability and employer incentives). 
 324. See id. at 308 (examining the effect of enhanced liability on deterrence 
goals). 
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systems that actually reduce harassment.325 Although the 
particular actions that employers might take would vary 
between workplaces, strict liability would, at a minimum, 
prompt firms to find out whether their employees are actually 
harassing one another—an action that today’s notice-based 
approach to liability discourages.326 Beyond taking steps to 
detect real-world incidents of harassment, strict liability would 
also encourage employers to investigate underlying causes of 
harassment at individual worksites such as sex-stratification, 
organizational culture, and opportunity structures for abuse 
within the company.327 Given that these causes and their 
associated remedies will inevitably vary by location, automatic 
liability would motivate firms to develop site-specific diagnoses 
and plans of action.328 Companies would be encouraged to take 
these steps to reduce liability, while recognizing that no system 
can stop all incidents of harassment. 
Closing the harassment loophole would not only advance 
Title VII’s deterrence goal, it would also serve the statute’s 
make-whole purpose. Compensating victims and deterring 
wrongdoing are central objectives of Title VII.329 For example, 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which expanded 
antidiscrimination remedies, emphasized the importance of 
 
 325. See Sykes, supra note 11, at 569 (explaining that harassment 
prevention depends in part on whether employers have practical measures for 
detecting instances of misconduct).  
 326. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 20, at 787–88 (asserting that 
under current liability rules employers “need not worry” about workplace 
harassment as long as it does not involve job decisions with economic 
consequences). 
 327. See Grossman, supra note 22, at 35–39 (discussing studies on the 
effectiveness of harassment prevention); Nuñez, supra note 133, at 502–03 
(highlighting the need for systemic solutions to harassment). 
 328. See Grossman, supra note 22, at 71–72 (“Such an approach will 
induce employers . . . to adapt standard measures to idiosyncratic problems 
they may face.”). 
 329. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 
(1995) (discussing the importance of prevention and compensation within Title 
VII’s remedial scheme); Grossman, supra note 30, at 720–21 (criticizing the 
Supreme Court for emphasizing deterrence over compensation when it created 
the harassment loophole). 
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victim compensation within Title VII’s statutory framework.330 
Even critics of the proposal outlined here would acknowledge 
that automatic liability would provide more opportunities to 
compensate plaintiffs.331 Under the current system of 
notice-based liability, victims of harassment rarely receive 
compensation because most of them never formally process their 
complaints through their employer’s internal reporting 
systems.332 Because the harassment loophole typically 
eliminates liability in these circumstances, silent victims must 
simply bear harassment costs alone. Even individuals who file 
credible allegations with firms mostly receive nothing if 
employers end the harassment.333 Under these circumstances, 
employers must compensate victims only in the unusual event 
that individuals formally complain and firms fail to respond 
appropriately.   
Extending strict employer liability to coworker harassment 
would dramatically advance Title VII’s compensatory objectives 
in a way that merely limiting vicarious liability to supervisory 
harassment would not. Contrary to the archetypal image of 
sexual harassment contained in prominent #MeToo stories, 
most victims are harassed by coworkers, rather than by 
high-level managers.334 Thus, if vicarious liability applied only 
to supervisory harassment, Title VII still would not redress 
most injuries. As such, to serve the statute’s make-whole goal, a 
revised rule of liability should encompass coworker harassment 
as well. 
A new approach to liability that shifted the costs of 
harassment from victims to firms would emphasize the shared 
harms that antidiscrimination violations cause.335 Both Title 
 
 330. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; see also Harper, supra note 34, at 58–59 
(outlining Title VII’s twin aims of prevention and remediation). 
 331. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 150–51 (examining the rationales 
for vicarious liability). 
 332. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 333. See id. 
 334. See Schultz, supra note 47, at 19 (summarizing data on harassment 
as measured by the harasser’s supervisory or non-supervisory status). 
 335. See Oppenheimer, supra note 27, at 94 (explaining how increasing 
employer liability distributes the costs of harassment). 
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VII and the #MeToo movement have stressed the need for 
collective investment in the problem of workplace 
harassment.336 For example, Title VII underscores the 
community goal of nondiscrimination and the societal losses 
that defendants generate when they violate the statue.337 
Likewise, the #MeToo movement has helped explain how sexual 
harassment causes collective injuries and not merely private 
harms.338 At its core, the movement has framed sexual 
misconduct as a community problem that individual victims 
should not have to solve alone.339 
In contrast to the status quo, in which individual victims 
mostly pay the price of harassment, a rule of expanded liability 
would recognize the superior ability of firms to absorb and 
spread these losses as a cost of doing business.340 Although this 
rule would hold employers responsible even for unpreventable 
harassment, firms already absorb similar costs in other 
antidiscrimination contexts. For example, employers must pay 
for discriminatory discharges, even when victims do not report 
the illegal behavior and even when employers have tried to 
prevent these wrongful acts.341 Faced with a choice between 
leaving victims uncompensated or forcing firms to pay for 
discrimination, courts have identified employers as the superior 
 
 336. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) 
(discussing Title VII’s preventative aims); Tippett, supra note 23, at 252 
(asserting that #MeToo represents “a collective cause” that may “serve to 
mobilize others”). 
 337. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974) 
(discussing Title VII’s shared project of discrimination eradication); see also 
Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Redefining the Rights of Undocumented 
Workers, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1361, 1409 (2009) (discussing Title VII’s “collective 
goal of combating unlawful employment practices”). 
 338. See Hill, supra note 32 (examining certain cultural misperceptions 
that the #MeToo movement has highlighted). 
 339. See Resnik, supra note 155, at 249 (critiquing the notion that 
harassment relates only to individual exchanges). 
 340. See Oppenheimer, supra note 29, at 276 (examining different 
justifications for expanding employer liability for harassment). 
 341. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70–71 (1986) (“[T]he 
courts have consistently held employers liable for the discriminatory 
discharges of employees by supervisory personnel, whether or not the 
employer knew, should have known, or approved of the supervisor’s actions.”). 
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cost-bearers in such scenarios.342 The same rationale applies to 
an employer’s responsibility to compensate individuals who 
experience workplace harassment. The law should impose these 
costs on the entity that can manage risks and spread losses, as 
opposed to imposing those costs on individual victims.343 This 
shift in liability rules would promote Title VII’s preventative 
and remedial goals, while recognizing the community’s stake in 
combating sexual harassment. 
IV.  OBJECTIONS TO EXPANDED EMPLOYER LIABILITY  
Critics could raise several objections to the current 
proposal. For example, strict employer liability might actually 
harm employees without reducing harassment. If the law held 
employers automatically responsible for harassment, some 
firms might over-monitor their workers, while others might 
reduce their compliance efforts given that liability would apply 
automatically no matter what they did.344 On the other hand, 
victims might not report instances of harassment to 
management because employer liability would not depend on 
notice.345 These dynamics could in turn disproportionately harm 
female workers because managers and male coworkers might 
limit their interactions with women to avoid harassment 
accusations.346 In addition, a rule of strict employer liability 
could prompt firms to arbitrarily fire accused harassers based 
 
 342. See Beiner, supra note 12, at 144–45 (addressing potential objections 
to a rule of strict employer liability for harassment). 
 343. See Chamallas, supra note 26, at 157 (outlining the efficiency and 
fairness rationales for vicarious liability). 
 344. See Stacey Dansky, Note, Eliminating Strict Employer Liability in 
Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment Cases, 76 TEX. L. REV. 435, 456–57 (1997) 
(“Subjecting employers to strict liability when they have clearly attempted to 
eradicate workplace harassment and taken remedial measures once notified 
of specific instances of supervisor harassment may deter them from even 
attempting to prevent or remedy the harassment.”). 
 345. See id. (explaining that strict liability may encourage women to stay 
silent or not report harassment). 
 346. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 60, at 88 (discussing fears of 
“ill-founded accusations of harassment” among certain workers). 
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on unsubstantiated charges.347 And even if the current proposal 
somehow avoided these problems, an expansion of employer 
liability would not necessarily curb harassment due to other 
structural deficiencies of federal antidiscrimination law.348 This 
section addresses these concerns and explains why, despite the 
facial appeal of each objection, strict liability represents a far 
more effective legal rule for combating harassment than the 
existing system of notice-based liability. 
A.  Ineffectiveness, Cosmetic Compliance, and Excessive 
Workplace Monitoring 
Strict employer liability could potentially lead to 
heightened workplace monitoring without necessarily reducing 
harassment.349 Twenty years ago, legal feminists engaged in a 
sustained critique of the sanitizing effect that harassment law 
had on workplace culture.350 Led by writers such as Vick Shultz 
and Janet Halley, these scholars explained how the legal test 
for sexual harassment policed sexual norms at work, while 
masking underlying forms of exploitation.351 Contrary to the 
popular view that harassing incidents always involved a 
 
 347. Id. 
 348. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1603–04 (describing Title VII’s 
practical limitations).  
 349. See Dansky, supra note 344, at 464 (“[A] strict liability standard may 
incite employers to make irrational and inefficient decisions to increase 
monitoring of the workplace beyond a point at which it is cost-justified.”). 
 350. See Kathryn Abrams, Subordination and Agency in Sexual 
Harassment Law, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 111, 111 
(Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2003) (examining early 
definitions of harassment); Arnow-Richman, supra note 60, at 88–89 
(summarizing criticisms of standard sexual harassment accounts). 
 351. See Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 183, 197–98 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel 
eds., 2003); Mary Anne Case, A Few Words in Favor of Cultivating an Incest 
Taboo in the Workplace, 33 VT. L. REV. 551, 552–53 (2009) (discussing feminist 
scholarship on the effects of harassment law); Vicki Schultz, 
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1686 (1998) 
(describing how the current regulation of workplace harassment fails to 
address many of the most debilitating forms of sex-based mistreatment); Vicki 
Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2064 (2003) (critiquing 
the promotion of “workplace asexuality”).  
 
218 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 155 (2021) 
 
male-female, sexual dynamic, Schultz argued that harassment 
affected all genders, took sexual and nonsexual forms, and 
involved the assertion of power rather than desire.352 In 
addition, Halley explained how employer antiharassment 
policies that focused exclusively on sex could disproportionately 
target sexual minorities and punish even innocuous or 
consensual sexualized behavior.353 In light of these dynamics, a 
firm’s compliance regime might potentially rid the workplace of 
references to sex, but allow other forms of gender-based 
harassment to take place.354 In other words, the law of sexual 
harassment could “sanitize” the workplace without necessarily 
combating many instances of harassment.355  
At first glance, it might appear that a rule of strict liability 
would only make matters worse by transforming the sanitized 
workplace into an “ultra-sanitized” workplace. After all, if the 
current system of notice-based liability already prompts 
employers to root out all forms of sexual expression, then a rule 
of automatic liability might incentivize even more invasive 
interventions.356 Although understandable, this fear mistakes 
the current system of cosmetic compliance with the more 
 
 352. See Mizrahi, supra note 41, at 121–22 (examining the relationship 
between Schultz’s critique and contemporary workplace developments); 
Schultz, supra note 351, at 1686–87 (“Yet much of the gender-based hostility 
and abuse that women (and some men) endure at work is neither driven by 
the desire for sexual relations nor even sexual in content.”).  
 353. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 60, at 88–89; Schultz, supra note 3, 
at 60 (outlining the unintended consequences of defining harassment in sexual 
terms); Halley, supra note 351, at 197–98 (discussing harassment regulation 
and queer theory); West, supra note 50 (summarizing Halley’s contention that 
sexual harassment law stigmatizes sexual expression). 
 354. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 33–34 ([“T]argeting only sexual 
misconduct without addressing related patterns of sexism and deeper 
institutional dynamics has serious shortcomings—shortcomings that risk 
undermining the broader quest for gender equality.”); Soucek, supra note 58, 
at 73–74 (discussing non-sexual forms of gender-based harassment). 
 355. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 24 (emphasizing the ongoing importance 
of identifying different iterations of gender-based harassment). 
 356. See Krieger, supra note 36, at 196 (summarizing concerns about 
antiharassment policies and sexual privacy).  
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meaningful prophylactic measures that a rule of strict liability 
would prompt employers to take.357  
Currently, employers highlight their attention to 
sexualized behaviors as a way to signal to employees, courts, 
and the public that they are serious about stopping sexual 
harassment.358 In reality, however, the current system of 
notice-based liability discourages employers from going beyond 
cosmetic compliance and genuinely scrutinizing their worksites 
for less obvious signs of gender-based mistreatment.359 In 
contrast to the harassment loophole, which requires victims to 
detect and report harassment themselves, strict employer 
liability would prompt employers to proactively assess the 
liability risks associated with existing workplace cultures.360 
For example, firms might survey their workforce to determine if 
employees are experiencing severe gender-based forms of 
mistreatment such as social ostracism, sabotage, segregation, or 
personal mockery.361 Although workplace monitoring would still 
occur under a rule of strict liability, the forms and goals of this 
observation would be quite different from those that occur under 
the current rule of notice-based liability. In contrast to the 
existing system that causes many employers to conduct myopic, 
superficial audits of sexualized behaviors, a rule of strict 
liability would prompt companies to look more comprehensively 
at the systems and interactions that give rise to gender-based 
abuse. Because courts would hold them strictly accountable, 
firms would scrutinize their worksites to find meaningful ways 
 
 357. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 69–70 (explaining how training 
programs can amount to “nothing more than symbolic or cosmetic gestures”). 
 358. See Tippett, supra note 23, at 244 (discussing the reasons why firms 
enact antiharassment systems). 
 359. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 84–85 (explaining how notice-based 
liability disincentivizes bona fide harassment investigations). 
 360. See Lawton, Bad Apple Theory, supra note 21, at 867–68 (considering 
the practical effects of a shift away from notice-based liability). 
 361. See Schultz, supra note 3, at 33–34 (2018); Soucek, supra note 58, at 
73–74 (explaining how gender-based harassment frequently takes 
non-sexualized forms). 
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to reduce harassment, rather than to engage in performative 
acts of compliance.362 
Beyond monitoring workers, expanded liability would 
induce employers to examine larger workplace structures that 
incubate harassing behaviors. For example, employers might 
identify certain organizational practices that often correlate 
with harassment such as sex segregation and pay disparities.363 
The point of these interventions would not be to eliminate 
sexuality from the workplace but to identify underlying systems 
that foster harassment and, accordingly, increase a firm’s 
exposure to strict Title VII liability. When certain companies 
today punish minor sexualized behavior, they engage in 
symbolic acts of compliance.364 Because a rule of strict employer 
liability would no longer reward these performative acts, 
expanded liability would induce firms to adopt systems that 
actually prevent harassment to avoid the risk of mounting Title 
VII costs.  
Finally, under the proposal outlined here, firms would still 
retain incentives to detect and correct ongoing harassment at 
worksites. Even though employers could not escape liability for 
proven instances of past harassment, they could still reduce the 
damages that they owe by effectively responding to complaints. 
The Supreme Court has already ruled that employers’ good faith 
efforts to comply with Title VII prevent plaintiffs from 
recovering punitive damages.365 In addition, an employer that 
effectively responds to reports of harassing behavior would 
 
 362. Cf. Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum, supra note 21, at 
210–13 (explaining that federal courts often fail to consider whether an 
employer’s superficial compliance actually resulted in a reduction in 
harassment at work).  
 363. Green, supra note 6, at 166–67 (examining employer solutions to 
harassment that go beyond training and complaint processes). 
 364. See Nuñez, supra note 133, at 488 (explaining how some 
“organizations engage in ‘symbolic compliance’ that leaves in place the 
practices that promote and maintain discrimination”). 
 365. See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999) 
(asserting that punitive damages are not warranted under Title VII when 
employers make good faith efforts to stop harassment); see also Nuñez, supra 
note 133, at 477 (discussing the relationship between punitive damages and 
the harassment loophole). 
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significantly diminish its exposure to compensatory and other 
damages by ending the harassment.366 But in contrast to the 
current state of affairs, in which a firm’s effective response to 
complaints absolves it of responsibility for even past damages, 
a rule of strict employer liability would allow firms to curtail 
prospective losses only. This opportunity to avoid responsibility 
for future harm would provide employers with incentives to 
stamp out harassment, even though such actions would have no 
effect on a firm’s obligation to pay for injuries that have already 
occurred. 
The effect that strict liability would have on victim 
reporting is less clear. Theoretically, victims could sit on their 
harassment claims, decline to inform management of 
harassment, and still sue. Therefore, it might seem like a rule 
of strict employer liability would undermine the goal of 
“encourag[ing] victims of harassment to come forward” that the 
Supreme Court articulated when it created the harassment 
loophole.367 But there are several legal and practical reasons 
why employees would still retain an incentive to informally 
resolve harassment complaints.368 First, as discussed above, the 
existing system of notice-based liability has not prompted 
widespread reporting because victims credibly fear that their 
employers will disbelieve their claims or retaliate against 
them.369 Thus, it is not clear how a shift in liability rules would 
undermine an already-broken reporting model. Second, many 
victims currently fail to report because they worry about losing 
their jobs.370 These individuals simply want the harassment to 
stop, but they view reporting as an ineffective method for 
achieving this end.371 In contrast, if strict employer liability 
 
 366. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 90–91 (outlining employer incentives 
for reducing harassment-related damages). 
 367. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998). 
 368. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 90–91 (describing incentives for 
employers to address harassment). 
 369. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 370. See Harper, supra note 34, at 78 (discussing the reasons why 
harassment victims do not utilize internal reporting systems).  
 371. See Porter, supra note 7, at 60 (explaining the need for proportionality 
in employers’ responses to harassment). 
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prompted firms to operationalize fair and proportionate 
reporting systems, victims would be more willing to come 
forward.  
At a very practical level, even if victims wanted to withhold 
their harassment reports from employers, Title VII does not 
afford them much time to do so. The statute of limitations for 
initiating Title VII proceedings is only 180 to 300 days, 
depending on the jurisdiction.372 Once individuals come forward, 
nothing in federal antidiscrimination law prevents employers 
from investigating the allegations and enacting appropriate 
remedial measures to limit future damages.373 The key 
difference between this proposal and the status quo, however, is 
that employers could not escape liability through summary 
judgment even if plaintiffs failed to file internal complaints.374 
As such, a jury or other fact finder could assess damages based 
on all harassment-related evidence.375 Such an outcome would 
allow plaintiffs to avoid dismissal and tell their stories to a 
broader legal audience—a central goal of #MeToo.376 Thus, in 
contrast to the current state of affairs, closing the harassment 
loophole would increase the incentives for employees to report 
misconduct and for employers to redress bona fide instances of 
harassment.  
B.  Due Process for the Accused 
Heightened employer liability could conceivably prompt 
businesses to fire accused harassers without offering them fair 
investigations. After all, if firms already engage in unfair or 
shoddy probes with notice-based liability in place, strict 
 
 372. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5. 
 373. See Carrillo, supra note 15, at 90–91 (indicating that employers can 
reduce potential exposure through remedial actions). 
 374. See State Regulation of Sexual Harassment, supra note 54, at 465 
(explaining why Title VII plaintiffs often fail to prevail in court). 
 375. See Lindstrom, supra note 91, at 132–33 (discussing the 
liability-damages distinction in harassment litigation). 
 376. See supra Part I.  
 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LOOPHOLE  223 
 
employer liability could potentially worsen the situation.377 But 
this critique wrongly conflates the performative nature of 
today’s investigations with more effective systems that the 
current proposal would encourage. The harassment loophole 
currently provides employers with several perverse incentives. 
First, as a system of notice-based liability, the loophole 
encourages employers to ignore harassment until it officially 
comes to the company’s attention.378 But once victims step 
forward, separate incentives materialize. To prove publicly that 
the firm is committed to antiharassment values, the 
harassment loophole motivates employers to summarily dismiss 
accused harassers without necessarily conducting fair 
investigations.379 The burden of this dynamic falls 
disproportionately on lower-status employees who the firm 
views as fungible.380 Faced with an official complaint, firms 
often balance the costs of liability against the perceived benefits 
that the alleged harasser provides to the employer.381 For 
lower-status workers, even benign sexualized statements can 
give rise to arbitrary disciplinary actions, as compared to the 
more extreme behaviors of certain high-level managers whom 
the company may nevertheless retain.382 
A rule of strict employer liability would fundamentally alter 
an employer’s incentives to indiscriminately punish alleged 
perpetrators.383 In contrast to the safe harbor provided by the 
 
 377. See Tippett, supra note 23, at 275 (examining the argument that 
#MeToo fails to afford due process rights to accused harassers). 
 378. See Willbrand, supra note 318, at 622 (explaining how the sexual 
harassment loophole encourages some employers to ignore harassment). 
 379. See Schultz et al., supra note 47, at 35–36 (underscoring the 
importance of contextualizing various forms of sexual expression). 
 380. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 60, at 91–92 (examining the effect 
that different workplace power dynamics have on employers’ responses to 
harassment allegations). 
 381. See Hébert, supra note 6, at 324–25 (outlining the “rare instances in 
which the targets of sexual harassment challenge the harassment by legal 
action”). 
 382. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 60, at 90–91 (discussing punishment 
and workplace hierarchy). 
 383. See Porter, supra note 7, at 60–61 (outlining an employer’s 
motivations for arbitrarily dismissing accused harassers). 
 
224 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 155 (2021) 
 
harassment loophole, the system proposed here would hold 
firms automatically liable for past harassment, regardless of 
notice and regardless of any remedial actions that the firm 
might take in response to complaints.384 Although putting a stop 
to harassing behaviors would limit future damages, firms could 
only achieve this end by first confirming the identities of actual 
harassers and determining what they did. As such, under the 
liability regime proposed here, employers would be less 
motivated to discipline or fire alleged perpetrators until a 
thorough investigation verified what happened. Even then, 
strict liability would be more likely to prompt measured 
responses from employers, given that the harassment loophole 
would no longer exist to reward firms for summarily firing 
harassers. Although a company might conclude that the 
perpetrator’s actions warrant discharge, it might also find that 
less-severe responses could safeguard against future bad acts. 
In other words, without the benefit of the harassment loophole 
and the incentive for immediate discharge that it creates, 
employers would be more likely to take care in ascertaining 
what actually occurred and how to solve the problem.  
C.  Marginalization of Women 
Opponents of expanded liability might fear that such a 
move could harm women’s workplace advancement.385 For 
example, the proposal might prompt male coworkers to avoid 
contact with women to fend off accusations of harassment.386 
Male supervisors in particular might refrain from mentoring 
women for fear that they could face harassment allegations.387 
Indeed, surveys taken in the wake of #MeToo suggest that a 
substantial proportion of male managers are reluctant to 
 
 384. See supra Part III. 
 385. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 69–70 (examining employee 
backlash to harassment training); Green, supra note 6, at 166–67 (same). 
 386. See Kim Elsesser, The Latest Consequence of #MeToo: Not Hiring 
Women, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2019), https://perma.cc/7UQX-5WJE (summarizing 
concerns related to sex segregation and the fallout from #MeToo). 
 387. See Grossman, supra note 22, at 48–49 (discussing the “unwanted 
effects” of harassment training). 
 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LOOPHOLE  225 
 
interact with female subordinates.388 For example, one 
post-#MeToo survey reported that a large share of male senior 
managers said that they would hesitate to hold one-on-one 
meetings with junior women or conduct work travel with 
them.389 If a high number of managers acted on these impulses, 
this exclusion could significantly hamper employment 
opportunities for women. After all, a worker’s progress at many 
firms depends on mentorship and social interactions with 
management.390 If they were denied these informal modes of 
networking, victims might have difficulty proving that these 
exclusionary acts happened, given that this type of 
discrimination often occurs off the record or without an official 
act.391   
Despite these genuine fears of ostracism and professional 
exclusion, however, such conduct already runs afoul of existing 
legal prohibitions. Sex-segregation is illegal under Title VII.392 
If male supervisors meet with men behind closed doors but 
refuse to meet with women, employers face automatic liability 
for these discriminatory acts.393 To the extent that less obvious 
forms of exclusion go undetected, these unremedied outcomes 
 
 388. See Working Relationships in the #MeToo Era, LEAN IN (2019), https://
perma.cc/3P7M-3G8F (“60% of managers who are men are uncomfortable 
participating in . . . common work activit[ies] with a woman, such as 
mentoring, working alone, or socializing together. That’s a 32% jump from a 
year ago.”); see also Nikki Graf, Sexual Harassment at Work in the Era of 
#MeToo, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 4, 2018), https://perma.cc/CHJ5-9BE6 
(reporting survey data on the public’s perception of #MeToo’s workplace 
impacts). 
 389. See Working Relationships in the #MeToo Era, supra note 388; see 
also Julie C. Ramirez, Is #MeToo Harming Women’s Careers, HUMAN RES. 
EXEC. (Sept. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/8CVC-NSK7 (stating that one-third of 
surveyed men were reluctant to conduct one-on-one meetings with women). 
 390. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1592 (considering the role that 
corporate law can play in reducing workplace harassment). 
 391. See generally Katherine Tarbox, Is #MeToo Backlash Hurting 
Women’s Opportunities in Finance?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 12, 2018), https://
perma.cc/Q232-5T22 (examining subtle forms of exclusion following #MeToo). 
 392. See Williams & Lebsock, supra note 38 (explaining how professional 
exclusion violates federal antidiscrimination law). 
 393. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, at 1675 (discussing backlash 
concerns associated with antidiscrimination expansions). 
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reveal limitations of antidiscrimination law, not with strict 
liability per se.394 In addition, a common argument against 
expanding many antidiscrimination protections has long 
asserted that increasing protections for various groups will 
cause employers to exclude those groups.395 But there is simply 
no justification in law or policy to avoid enforcing Title VII 
simply because some actors might engage in additional Title VII 
violations.396 The theoretical costs of this proposal (i.e., 
increased denial of mentorship and advancement opportunities 
for women) must be weighed against the known costs of the 
harassment loophole (i.e., widespread, unremedied 
harassment). Given the recognized harms associated with the 
status quo, the fear that some managers might engage in 
additional forms of sex discrimination cannot justify continuing 
to maintain a legal rule that provides employers with safe 
harbor from harassment liability. 
D.  Policing Minor Transgressions and Ongoing Title VII 
Limitations 
Critics could argue that the current proposal is both 
overinclusive and underinclusive. As to the former critique, 
some observers might disfavor expanded liability because of the 
burden that it would place on employers to answer for even 
minor employee transgressions.397 After all, if courts required 
employers to pay for every instance of workplace harassment, 
 
 394. See Goldberg, supra note 39, at 805 (examining forms of subtle 
discrimination); Sturm, supra note 39, at 468 (outlining antidiscrimination 
law’s role in perpetuating the exclusion of nondominant groups). 
 395. See Hemel & Lund, supra note 24, 1674–75 (discounting the 
argument that the law should not penalize executives for engaging in illegal 
behavior because they might engage in other illegal behavior). 
 396. See id. (arguing for enforcement of Title VII despite arguments that 
enforcement might cause employers to exclude women from the workplace); 
Patrick S. Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought 
Experiment in the Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS 
L.J. 67, 85 (2010) (summarizing the argument that increased employer 
liability for unconscious bias will harm statutorily protected groups). 
 397. See Bisom-Rapp, supra note 8, at 69–70 (examining the consequences 
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then what would prevent disgruntled workers from suing their 
firms even for trivial claims? But despite this understandable 
fear of overreach, several doctrinal features of Title VII would 
mediate against excessive employer exposure. 
Even with automatic liability in place, the law of sexual 
harassment would still require plaintiffs to prove that their 
mistreatment was both “unwelcome” and “severe or 
pervasive.”398 Scholars have criticized these standards for 
narrowly defining the meaning of harassment and for unfairly 
focusing on victims’ behavior with the “unwelcome” analysis.399 
Without endorsing either proof requirement, this proposal 
simply acknowledges the widely held view that these rules 
represent high hurdles to overcome for harassment plaintiffs.400 
In many cases, federal judges have famously concluded that 
plaintiffs did not experience “severe or pervasive” abuse even 
when they were threatened, groped, or assaulted.401 Closing the 
harassment loophole would not lower this considerable 
threshold for proving harassment. Thus, even with a rule of 
strict liability, Title VII would still require employers to answer 
 
 398. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (“Conduct that 
is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive 
work environment—an environment that a reasonable person would find 
hostile or abusive—is beyond Title VII’s purview.”); Baker, supra note 153, at 
220–21 (discussing proof requirements for harassment claims). 
 399. See SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S 
COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 2 (2017) (examining the dismissal of 
harassment claims that were not “sufficiently serious to be considered 
discrimination”); Estrich, supra note 38, at 827–47 (critiquing both the 
“unwelcome” and “severe or pervasive” requirement); Larson, supra note 313, 
at 131 (asserting that an analysis of “unwelcomeness” encourages courts to 
scrutinize victim behavior). 
 400. See Estrich, supra note 38, at 843 (discussing the challenge of 
establishing facts that constitute legally cognizable harassment); see also 
Davis, supra note 60, at 1063 (analyzing Title VII’s “demanding standard” for 
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 401. See SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 399, at 3–9 (summarizing 
harassment decisions that resulted in dismissal); Hébert, supra note 6, at 330 
(criticizing courts for “seemingly trying to outdo each other in finding truly 
awful, demeaning conduct to be insufficiently abusive to be actionable”). 
 
228 78 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 155 (2021) 
 
only for the most severe forms of gender-based mistreatment at 
work.402 
In contrast to the charge that the present proposal is 
overinclusive, some might claim that it does not go far enough 
in light of other doctrinal impediments. For example, Title VII 
has a short statute of limitations, limits victim recovery, and 
does not even apply to small firms that employ fewer than 
fifteen people.403 In addition, many employers force victims to 
resolve their harassment claims in private arbitration or to sign 
nondisclosure agreements.404 A rule of strict employer liability 
would not change these very real shortcomings of employment 
law.  
But without discounting the practical and legal obstacles 
that victims currently face, there are several reasons why a shift 
toward strict employer liability could significantly improve the 
legal landscape for harassment plaintiffs. First, advocacy 
groups are currently attempting to parlay the awareness 
created by #MeToo into broader structural and legal reforms.405 
To the extent that this work prompts changes in state or federal 
antidiscrimination laws, the proposal outlined here can 
complement these ongoing reform efforts.406 Second, plaintiffs 
currently lose their harassment claims at extremely high rates, 
with employers receiving full or partial summary judgment in 
the majority of federal harassment cases.407 Notice-based 
liability substantially contributes to these losses because 
 
 402. Hébert, supra note 6, at 330 (describing the high bar for proving 
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 403. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-5; see also Jane Byeff Korn, The 
Fungible Woman and Other Myths of Sexual Harassment, 67 TUL. L. REV. 
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employers overwhelmingly win when they deploy the 
harassment loophole.408 Over 85 percent of individuals who 
experience harassment never officially tell their employers 
about the problem.409 Combined with the safe harbor provided 
by notice-based liability, this pervasive silence means that the 
vast majority of victims cannot obtain legal redress.410 Even if 
legislators cured Title VII’s other deficiencies, the harassment 
loophole would still allow courts and arbitrators to dismiss 
harassment claims when victims fail to file internal complaints. 
Given these practical and legal realities, closing the harassment 
loophole represents one of the most impactful Title VII reforms 
that advocates could advance. 
CONCLUSION 
What is the lasting impact of the #MeToo movement? 
Although #MeToo has revealed patterns of widespread 
harassment and enabled victims to come forward, the 
movement has not yet altered the legal rules that allow sexual 
harassment to flourish.411 In light of these circumstances, 
#MeToo represents an extraordinary opportunity to listen, but 
also a chance to initiate legal changes that can meaningfully 
reduce harassment going forward.412   
Closing the harassment loophole represents a tangible legal 
solution to the workplace problems that #MeToo has identified. 
Just as employers must automatically pay for all other Title VII 
violations, they should pay for sexual harassment. This 
development would not only harmonize antidiscrimination law, 
it would advance the pressing goal of combating sexual 
harassment in American workplaces. 
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